

# Lecture 35: More Common Knowledge


CS 181O  
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Kim Bruce

*Some slides based on those of Christina Unger*

## New situation

- Three cards: red, white, blue, and three players: Alice, Bob, and Carol. Deal the three cards out to three players, face down. Each looks at her own card.


## Possible Worlds



Solid = Alice  
Small dotted = Bob  
Big dotted = Carol

Lines represent accessibility  
relation for each player

## Possible Worlds



What if Alice says her card is red? How does this change possible worlds?  
What if Alice says her card is not white

## Propositional Dynamic Logic

- Originated in theoretical CS to prove programs correct.
- Added infinite number of modal operators associated with (non-deterministic) programs.
  - $[\pi]\phi$  true iff after every execution of  $\pi$ ,  $\phi$  will be true.
  - $\langle\pi\rangle\phi$  true iff after some execution of  $\pi$ ,  $\phi$  will be true.

## Programs

- Programs built out of primitive statements a,b, ... using
  - $\phi \cup \psi$  (for non-determinism),
  - $\phi ; \psi$  (for composition)
  - $\phi^*$  (for iteration)
  - $\phi?$  (for test): if  $\phi$  true then continue, else fail

## Models

- ... are of the form  $\mathcal{M} = (\mathbb{W}, \{R^\pi \mid \pi \text{ is a program}\}, V)$  where  $\mathbb{W}$  is set of worlds, each  $R^\pi \subseteq \mathbb{W} \times \mathbb{W}$  and  $V$  is valuation on each world.
  - $R^{[\phi?]} = \{(w,w) \mid \mathcal{M}, w \models \phi\}$
  - $R^{\pi_1 \cup \pi_2} = R^{\pi_1} \cup R^{\pi_2}$ ,
  - $R^{\pi_1 ; \pi_2} = R^{\pi_1} \circ R^{\pi_2} (= \{(x,y) \mid \exists z (R^{\pi_1}(x,z) \wedge R^{\pi_2}(z,y))\})$ ,
  - $R^{(\pi^*)} = (R^\pi)^*$ , the reflexive transitive closure of  $R^\pi$
- Start w/ transitions on primitive programs & compose meanings as above.

## Expressiveness

- Can encode regular programs:
  - $(p? ; a) \cup (\neg p? ; b) \approx$  if p then a else b
  - $a ; (\neg p? ; a)^* \approx$  repeat a until p
  - $(p? ; a)^* ; \neg p? \approx$  while p do a
- Theorem. PDL has the finite model property and is decidable. Its satisfiability problem is EXPTIME-complete.

## Epistemic Dynamic Logic

- Let  $a$  be accessibility relation for an agent,  $\phi$  is statement that can be true or false, while  $\alpha$  is an accessibility relation.
- $\phi ::= \top, p, \neg\phi, \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2, [\alpha]\phi, [!\phi_1]\phi_2$
- $\alpha ::= a \mid ?\phi \mid \alpha_1; \alpha_2 \mid \alpha_1 \cup \alpha_2 \mid \alpha^*$
- Interpret in model  $\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathbb{W}, V, R \rangle$  where  $\mathbb{W}$  is possible worlds,  $V$  assigns values to prop letters, and  $R$  assigns each agent an equivalence relation to show accessible worlds

## Epistemic Dynamic Logic

- Let  $P$  be set of proposition letters and  $A$  set of agents.
- Interpret formulas over  $A, P$  in model  $\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathbb{W}, V, R \rangle$  where  $\mathbb{W}$  is possible worlds,  $V: \mathbb{W} \rightarrow \mathbb{t}$  assigns truth values to prop letters, &  $R$  assigns each agent an equivalence relation to relate mutually accessible worlds
  - Assume accessibility is reflexive, symmetric, transitive

## Interpreting formulas

- Formulas interpreted as set of worlds true of.
- Interpret  $\top, p, \neg\phi, \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2$  as usual.
- $[[[\alpha]\phi]]\mathcal{M} = \{w \in \mathbb{W} \mid \forall v, \text{ if } (w,v) \in [[[\alpha]]\mathcal{M} \text{ then } v \in [[\phi]]\mathcal{M}\}$ , I.e.  $\phi$  true in all accessible worlds for  $[[[\alpha]]\mathcal{M}$ , so “ $a$  knows  $\phi$ ”
- $[[[!\phi_1]\phi_2]]\mathcal{M} = (\mathbb{W} - [[[\phi_1]]\mathcal{M}) \cup [[[\phi_2]]\mathcal{M} \mid \phi_1$  where  $\mathcal{M} \mid \phi_1 = (\mathbb{W}', V', R')$  with  $\mathbb{W}' = [[[\phi_1]]\mathcal{M}$ ,  $V' = V$  restricted to  $\mathbb{W}'$ , &  $R'(a) = R(a)$  restricted to  $\mathbb{W}'$  for each  $a$ .

## Example Formulas

- $[a]p$ :  $a$  “knows”  $p$  (because true in all of  $a$ 's accessible worlds)
- $\neg[a]\neg p$ :  $p$  is compatible with what  $a$  knows (some accessible world makes it true)
- $[(a \cup b)^*]p$ : It is common knowledge for  $a, b$  that  $p$
- $[!\phi_1]\phi_2$  says after announcement of  $\phi_1$ ,  $\phi_2$  will be true. Effect is to restrict model to only those worlds in which  $\phi_1$  is true.
  - $M, w \models [!\phi]\psi$  iff  $(M, w \models \phi \text{ implies } M \mid \phi, w \models \psi)$

## Properties of $!\phi$

- $![\phi] p \Leftrightarrow \phi \rightarrow p$
- $![\phi] \neg \psi \Leftrightarrow \phi \rightarrow \neg ![ \phi ] \psi$
- $![\phi] (\psi_1 \wedge \psi_2) \Leftrightarrow ![\phi] \psi_1 \wedge ![\phi] \psi_2$
  
- Go back to card model and see effect of public announcement.

## Application: Presuppositions

- A presupposition of an utterance is an implicit assumption about the world or a background belief shared by speaker & hearer in a discourse.
- “Shall we do it again?”
  - Presupposition: we have done it before.
- “Jan washed her car.”
  - Presupposition: ‘Jan’ has a car (& Jan is female)

## More Presuppositions

- The king of France is bald
  - There is a unique king of France
- Mary knows Bob is at the store
  - Bob is at the store
- Mary stopped beating her dog.
  - Mary has a dog and formerly beat it.
- If I were superman, then I could fly.
  - I’m not superman

## Entailment vs Presupposition

- Jan has a red car  $\Rightarrow$  Jan has a car
- Jan washed her car  $\Rightarrow$  Jan has a car
- Tests for distinction:
  - Presuppositions are preserved under negation
    - Jan did not wash her car  $\Rightarrow$  Jan has a car
    - Jan does not have a red car  $\not\Rightarrow$  Jan has a car

## In Logic

- Jan washed her car:
  - $\exists c. (\text{car}(c) \wedge \text{owns}(\text{jan},c) \wedge \text{female}(\text{jan}) \wedge \text{washed}(\text{jan},c))$
- Jan did not wash her car:
  - $\exists c. (\text{car}(c) \wedge \text{owns}(\text{jan},c) \wedge \text{female}(\text{jan}) \neg \text{washed}(\text{jan},c))$
  - This is *not* the negation of the first!
- Strawson:
  - Let  $\phi$  and  $\psi$  be propositions:  $\phi$  presupposes  $\psi$  iff  $\psi$  is a precondition of the truth or falsity of  $\phi$ . I.e., if  $\phi$  is either true or false then  $\psi$  is true.

## Test for Presuppositions

- Negation ✓ *Check on earlier examples*
- Question: Make statement into question.
  - Did Jan wash her car?
  - Is the king of France bald?
  - Compare: Does Jan have a red car?
- Conditional: Make it an antecedent:
  - If Jan washed her car then it is clean
    - Presupposition Jan has a car remains
    - Compare: If Jan has a red car then it is clear
    - Entailment of Jan has a car disappears

## Common Knowledge

- Suppose have update:  $![(i \cup j)^*]\phi$ 
  - It is common knowledge between  $i$  and  $j$  that  $\phi$ .
  - If  $\phi$  is already common knowledge then no impact
  - If not common knowledge then remove all worlds!
    - $[[[(i \cup j)^*]\phi]] = \{w \mid \forall v \text{ s.t. } (w,v) \in (i \cup j)^*, v \in [[\phi]]\}$

## Common Knowledge & Presuppositions

- Presupposition is common knowledge between speaker and listener.
  - Jan washed her car
  - $\exists c. [(i \cup j)^*](\text{car}(c) \wedge \text{owns}(\text{jan},c) \wedge \text{female}(\text{jan})) \wedge \text{washed}(\text{jan},c))$
  - First part common knowledge, last not!

Questions?