Lecture 27: Discourse Representation Theory

CS 181O Spring 2016 Kim Bruce

Some slides based on those of Christina Unger


Discourse Representation Structures

- A DRS consists of two parts:
 - a set of referent markers (or: discourse referents) for the entities that a discourse is about
 - a set of conditions (formulas)
- Example: The boy ate dinner.

x, y	
boy(x)	
dinner(y)	
ate(x,y)	

Discourse Representation Structures

• Example: The boy ate dinner. It was good.




Referent Markers

- The referent markers in the universe of a DRS are interpreted existentially.
- All referent markers in the universe of a context DRS are available as antecedents to pronouns and other anaphoric expressions that are interpreted within this context.
- The interpretation of a sentence S in the context provided by a DRS D results in a new DRS D', which captures the content represented by D together with the content of S, as interpreted with respect to D.

Proper Names

• Ex: Alice admires Snow White



- Where Alice(x) means 'x is an individual named Alice'. Rationale: There can be many persons named Alice and it depends on the context which one is meant.
- Problem: Alice admires Snow White does not mean someone called Alice admits someone called SnowWhite but expresses that a certain individual loves a certain other one. They are really constants!


Conditionals

• Conditional elements (and universal quantifiers) introduce subordinated DRSs.

Example


played(x)


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


Example

- Universals are similar:
 - Every boy who came played.








Referent markers

- The logical role played by a referent marker depends on the DRS-universe to which it belongs:
 - Referent markers belonging to the universe of the main DRS get an existential interpretation.
 - The role of referent markers in subordinate universes is determined by the principles governing the complex DRS conditions to which they belong.

Negation A worried child does not laugh x child(x) worried(x) _ laugh(x)



DRS

- A discourse representation structure (DRS) consists of:
 - a finite set of referent markers (the discourse universe)
 - a finite set of conditions, which are one of the following:
 - atom (a predicate name applied to referent markers)
 - link (an expression x = y or x ≠ y, where x,y are referent markers)
 - complex condition (a negated DRS or implication of DRSs)

More Formally


- Let Ref be a set of referent markers, Const a set of constants, and Reln sets of n-ary predicate constants. The set of DRSs and conditions is the smallest set that satisfies:
 - If U ⊆ Ref and Con is a (possibly empty) set of conditions, then (U,Con) is a DRS.
 - If $t_1,...,t_n \in \text{Ref} \cup \text{Const}$ and $R \in \text{Rel}^n$, then $R(t_1,...,t_n)$ and $t_i = t_j$ (for $i \le i, j \le n$) are atomic conditions.
 - If D_I , D_2 are DRSs, $v \in \text{Ref}$ and Q is a quantifier, then $\neg D_I$ and $D_I \langle Q v \rangle D_2$ are complex conditions.

Even More Formally

- Definition: Let *c* range over a set of constants, *P* over a set of predicates with given arity, and Q over quantifiers.
 - Markers $\mathbf{v} ::= v | \mathbf{v}'$
 - Terms **t** ::=*c* | **v**
 - Conditions $\mathbf{C} ::= \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{t},...,\mathbf{t}) | \mathbf{v} = \mathbf{t} | \mathbf{v} \neq \mathbf{t} | \neg \mathbf{D}$
 - DRSs **D** ::= ({**v**,...,**v**},{**C**,...,**C**})
 - Use convention, $(\{v_1,...,v_n\}, \{C_1,...,C_n\}) \Rightarrow D$ abbreviates $\neg(\{v_1,...,v_n\}, \{C_1,...,C_n,D\})$

Abbreviation

• Use convention, $(\{v_1,...,v_n\}, \{C_1,...,C_n\}) \Rightarrow D$ abbreviates $\neg(\{v_1,...,v_n\}, \{C_1,...,C_n,D\})$




Observation

- Referents introduced in the context of scopetaking elements, such as negation and implications, are available as antecedent only inside this scope.
 - Each candidate thinks she is the best.
 - Each candidate speaks. #He is obnoxious.
 - John didn't eat anything. #It was delicious.


On the other hand ...

- Referents introduced by proper names are available as antecedents throughout the whole context.
 - John didn't convince Mary. She didn't like his views.
- Bottom line: Availability is captured by the structure of subordinated DRSs together with an accessibility relation among referent markers.




Accessibility

x available to these ys:



Accessibility

x available to these ys:



Models & Assignments

- Let M = $\langle U,I \rangle$ be a model, where
 - U is a non-empty domain
 - I is an interpretation function that maps
 - n-place predicate names to n-place relations on U
 - individual constants to members of U
- Let s and s be assignments that map reference markers to elements of U, then $s[x_1,...,x_n]s'$ denotes that s is equal to s' except possibly on the values of $x_1,...,x_n$

Embedding Semantics

- An assignment s verifies DRS D = ({v1,...,vn}, {C₁,...,C_m}) in M if there is an assignment s' with s[v₁,...,v_n]s' which satisfies every member of {C₁,...,C_m} in M.
- Remember, reference markers represent realizations of existential quantifiers.

Embedding Semantics

- s satisfies $P(t_1,...,t_n)$ in M iff $\langle V(t_1),...,V(t_n) \rangle \in I(P)$, where $V(t_i)$ is $s(t_i)$ if t_i is a variable & I (t_i) otherwise
- s satisfies v=t in M iff s(v) = V(t)
- s satisfies $v \neq t$ in M iff $s(v) \neq V(t)$
- s satisfies $\neg D$ in M iff s does not verify D in M
- Can derive:
 - s satisfies $D_{r}\!\Rightarrow\!D_{2}$ iff all s with s[v]s' that satisfy all conditions in D_{r} also satisfy D_{2}

Free Variables

- Structure D is true in M if there is an assignment which verifies D in M.
- From the definitions above, it follows that (Ø,{P(x,y)}) is true in M iff ({x,y},{P(x,y)}) is true in M, i.e. free variables are existentially quantified.


Expressive Power of DRT same as first-order logic

DRT to FOL

- °:DRS \rightarrow FOL:
 - If $D = (\{v_1, \dots, v_n\}, \{C_1, \dots, C_m\})$ then $D^\circ = \exists v_1 \cdots \exists v_n. (C_1 \land \dots \land C_m).$
 - Atomic conditions: C^o =C
 - Negations: $(\neg D)^\circ = \neg D^\circ$
 - Can show: $(D_1 \Rightarrow D_2)^\circ = \forall v_1 \cdots v_n.((C_1 \land ... \land C_m) \Rightarrow D^\circ_2) \text{ if }$ $D_1 = (\{v_1, \dots, v_n\}, \{C_1, \dots, C_m\})$

Example


• A dog does not eat chicken



 $\exists x. dog(x) \land \neg (\exists y. (chicken(y) \land eat(x,y)))$

Donkey Sentences

• Every farmer who owns a donkey, feeds him



 $\forall x \forall y .((farmer(x) \land donkey(y) \land own(x, y)) \rightarrow \exists u.(feed(x, u) \land u = y))$

FOL to DRT

- Atomic formulas: C* =(Ø,C)
- Conjunctions: $(\phi \land \psi)^* = (\emptyset, \{\phi^*, \psi^*\})$
- Negations: $(\neg \phi)^* = (\emptyset, \neg \phi^*)$
- Existential quantification: (∃v,φ)* =(first φ* ∪ {v}, second φ*)
- Universal quantification: $(\forall v.\phi)^* = (\neg \exists v.\neg \phi)^*$

But want more ...

- Provided static semantics,
 - but want dynamic semantics: context change!
- Contexts are often seen also as information states, i.e. as constituted by all the information collected by the discourse so far, together with a collection of salient individuals.
- Sentence interpreted as context change potential

Context Change Potential

