

## Lecture 22: Intensional Logic

CS 181O  
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## Extension vs Intension

- Opaque contexts
  - Eight is necessarily greater than seven.  
The number of planets in our solar system is necessarily greater than seven.
  - I believe that Jane talked to the President of Pomona.  
I believe that Jane talked to David Oxtoby.
  - Mary is looking for the President of Pomona.  
Mary is looking for David Oxtoby.
  - Since those sentences mean different things, meaning seems to be more than reference.
  - Truth depends on possible as well as actual worlds.

## Intensional Operators

- Intensional models help interpret
  - adjectives like “fake”, “former”,
  - attitude verbs like “want”, “hope”
  - “must”, “may”, “necessarily”, “possibly”

## Intensional Propositional Logic


- If  $p$  is a proposition letter, then  $p$  is a formula
- If  $\phi$  and  $\psi$  are formulas then so are  $\phi \wedge \psi$ ,  $\phi \vee \psi$ ,  $\phi \rightarrow \psi$ ,  $\neg \phi$ , and  $\Box \phi$ .
  - Meaning of  $\Box \phi$  will depend on the set of contexts that we are interested in
    - Necessarily  $\phi$ , always in the future  $\phi$ , ...

# Models for Intensional Logic

- A (Kripke) model  $M$  consists of
  - a non-empty set  $W$  of contexts,
  - a binary relation  $R$  on  $W$ , the accessibility relation
  - A valuation function  $V$  which assigns a truth value  $V_w(p)$  to every proposition letter  $p$  in each context  $w$ .
- Contexts referred to as possible worlds
- Combination of  $W, R$  called a “frame”

# Contexts & Accessibility

- Accessibility relation:
  - $R = \{(v1, v2), (v2, v2), (v2, v3), (v2, v4), (v2, v7), (v3, v5), (v3, v6), (v3, v7), (v4, v7), (v4, v8), (v8, v8)\}$



# Truth in Intensional Propositional Logic


- Let  $M$  be model with  $W$  as set of possible worlds,  $R$  as accessibility relation, and  $V$  as valuation, then  $V_{M,w}(\phi)$ , the truth value of  $\phi$  in  $w$  given  $M$  is defined as follows:
  - $V_{M,w}(p) = V_w(p)$  for all proposition letters  $p$ .
  - $V_{M,w}(\neg\phi) = \text{true}$  iff  $V_w(\phi) = \text{false}$ .
  - $V_{M,w}(\phi \rightarrow \psi) = \text{true}$  iff  $V_{M,w}(\phi) = \text{false}$  or  $V_{M,w}(\psi) = \text{true}$ .
  - ...
  - $V_{M,w}(\Box\phi) = \text{true}$  iff  $\forall w' \in W$  s.t.  $\langle w, w' \rangle \in R$ ,  $V_{M,w'}(\phi) = \text{true}$ .

# Modal Logic: Necessity

- Replace  $\Box\phi$  by  $\Box\phi$ , dual  $\Diamond\phi \equiv \neg\Box\neg\phi$ 
  - $\Box\phi$  means “necessarily  $\phi$ ”
  - $\Diamond\phi$  means “possibly  $\phi$ ”
- If  $\phi$  stands for “you understand me”, then translate: “It is possible that you understand me, but it isn’t necessary” as  $\Diamond\phi \wedge \neg\Box\phi$

## Interpreting Necessity

- Label worlds with p or  $\neg p$



Which worlds satisfy  $\Box p$ ,  $\Diamond p$ ?

What about  $\Box \Diamond p$ ,  $\Box \Box p$ ?

## Structure & Truth

- With which accessibility relations are the following expressions always true?
  - $\Box \phi \rightarrow \phi$
  - $\Box(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\Box \phi \rightarrow \Box \psi)$
  - $\Box \Box \phi \rightarrow \Box \phi$
  - $\Diamond \Box \phi \rightarrow \phi$

## Other Modal Operators

- Operations on sentences:
  - must, may
    - lots of different senses, eg. “you must drive the speed limit” vs 1+1 must equal 2
  - knows
  - wants
  - hope
- Can also reason about time with modal operators:
  - always in the future, at some time in the future

## Counterfactuals & Possible Worlds

- *If I didn't come to Pomona, you would not be taking this course.*
- *If I didn't come to Pomona, you would be crying.*
- Why is the first more plausible, even though they are both true in propositional logic?

## Interpretations of Frames

- Interpreting “must” (“may is the dual”)
  - Epistemic:  $w \text{ Epi}_x w'$  iff  $w'$  conforms to what  $x$  knows in  $w$ .
  - Deontic:  $w \text{ Deo } w'$  iff all the obligations are fulfilled in  $w'$  and  $w'$  is maximally similar to  $w$  otherwise.
  - $w \text{ Dox}_x w'$  iff  $w'$  conforms to what  $x$  believes in  $w$  to be the case.
  - Bouletic:  $w \text{ Bou}_x w'$  iff  $w'$  conforms to what  $x$  desires in  $w$  for it to be the case

## Types

- Let  $s$  be type for set of worlds, with  $e$  and  $t$  as before.  $s$  can only be used as a domain of functions.
- The set of all types,  $T$ , is the smallest set such that
  - $e, t \in T$
  - if  $a, b \in T$  then so is  $a \rightarrow b$
  - if  $a \in T$ , then so is  $s \rightarrow a$

## Predicate Modal Logic

- Add  $\Box\phi, \Diamond\phi$  to predicate logic as well as terms  $\hat{\phi}$  and  $\forall\phi$  to represent the intension of  $\phi$  and interpreting  $\phi$  in the current world.

## Predicate Modal Logic

- Add  $\Box, \Diamond$  to predicate logic.
- Definition. A model consists of
  - a non-empty set  $W$  of worlds
  - A binary accessibility relation  $R$  on  $W$ .
  - A domain  $D$
  - An interpretation function  $I$  which assigns
    - an entity  $I(c)$  to each constant  $c$  of  $L$ ,
    - A non-empty subset  $I_w(E)$  of  $D$  to  $E$  for each world  $w$  in  $W$ , and
    - for every world  $w$  in  $W$ , a subset  $I_w(R)$  of  $D_w^n$  to each  $n$ -ary predicate symbol  $R$  of  $L$ .

## See model in EAI.hs

- $I\text{Bool} = \text{World} \rightarrow \text{Bool}$
- $I\text{Entity} = \text{World} \rightarrow \text{Entity}$
- $i\text{Sent} :: \text{Sent} \rightarrow I\text{Bool}$
- $i\text{NP} :: \text{NP} \rightarrow (I\text{Entity} \rightarrow I\text{Bool}) \rightarrow I\text{Bool}$
- $i\text{VP} :: \text{VP} \rightarrow (I\text{Entity} \rightarrow I\text{Bool})$
- $i\text{CN} :: \text{CN} \rightarrow (I\text{Entity} \rightarrow I\text{Bool})$
- $i\text{Det} :: \text{DET} \rightarrow (I\text{Entity} \rightarrow I\text{Bool}) \rightarrow (I\text{Entity} \rightarrow I\text{Bool}) \rightarrow I\text{Bool}$

Questions?