

17 REPRESENTING MEANING

ISHMAEL: *Surely all this is not without meaning.*
Herman Melville, *Moby Dick*

MEANING
REPRESENTATIONS

MEANING
REPRESENTATION
LANGUAGES

The approach to semantics introduced here, and elaborated on in the next four chapters, is based on the notion that the meaning of linguistic utterances can be captured in formal structures, which we will call **meaning representations**. Correspondingly, the frameworks that are used to specify the syntax and semantics of these representations will be called **meaning representation languages**. These meaning representations play a role analogous to that of the phonological, morphological, and syntactic representations introduced in earlier chapters.

The need for meaning representations arises when neither the raw linguistic inputs, nor any of the structures derivable from them by any of the transducers we have studied thus far, facilitate the kind of semantic processing that is desired. More specifically, what we need are representations that bridge the gap from linguistic inputs to the non-linguistic knowledge of the world needed to perform tasks involving the meaning of linguistic inputs. To illustrate this notion, consider the following everyday language tasks that require some form of semantic processing of natural language:

- Answering an essay question on an exam;
- Deciding what to order at a restaurant by reading a menu;
- Learning to use a new piece of software by reading the manual;
- Realizing that you've been insulted; and
- Following a recipe.

Simply having access to the phonological, morphological, and syntactic representations that we have discussed thus far will not get us very far on accomplishing

any of these tasks. These tasks require access to representations that link the linguistic elements involved in the task to the non-linguistic *knowledge of the world* needed to successfully accomplish them. For example, some of the world knowledge needed to perform the above tasks would include the following:

- Answering and grading essay questions requires background knowledge about the topic of the question, the desired knowledge level of the students, and how such questions are *normally* answered.
- Reading a menu and deciding what to order, giving advice about where to go to dinner, following a recipe, and generating new recipes all require knowledge about food, its preparation, what people like to eat and what restaurants are like.
- Learning to use a piece of software by reading a manual, or giving advice about how to do the same, requires knowledge about current computers, the specific software in question, similar software applications, and knowledge about users in general.


In the representational approach explored here, we take linguistic inputs and construct meaning representations that are made up of the *same kind of stuff* that is used to represent this kind of everyday commonsense knowledge of the world. The process whereby such representations are created and assigned to linguistic inputs is called **semantic analysis**.

SEMANTIC ANALYSIS

To make this notion a bit more concrete, consider Fig. 17.1, which shows sample meaning representations for the sentence *I have a car* using four representative meaning representation languages. The first row illustrates a sentence in **First-Order Logic**, which will be covered in detail in Section 17.4; the graph in the center illustrates a **Semantic Network**, which will be discussed further in Section 17.6; the third row contains a **Conceptual Dependency** diagram, discussed in more detail in Ch. 19, and finally a **Frame-Based** representation, also covered in Section 17.6.

While there are non-trivial differences among these approaches, at an abstract level they all share as a common foundation the notion that a meaning representation consists of structures composed from a set of symbols, or representational vocabulary. When appropriately arranged, these symbol structures are taken to *correspond* to the objects, properties of objects and relations among objects in some state of affairs being represented. In this case, all four representations make use of symbols corresponding to the speaker, a car, and relations denoting the possession of one by the other.

It is important to note that these representations can be viewed from at least two distinct perspectives in all four of these approaches: as representations of the meaning of the particular linguistic input *I have a car*, and as representations of



the state of affairs in some world. It is this dual perspective that allows these representations to be used to link linguistic inputs to the world and to our knowledge of it.

The structure of this part of the book parallels that of the previous parts. We will alternate discussions of the nature of meaning representations with discussions of the computational processes that can produce them. More specifically, this chapter introduces the basics of what is needed in a meaning representation, while Ch. 18 introduces a number of techniques for assigning meanings to linguistic inputs. Ch. 19 explores a range of complex representational issues related to the meanings of words. Ch. 20 then explores some robust computational methods designed to exploit these lexical representations.

Since the focus of this chapter is on some of the basic requirements for meaning representations, we will defer a number of extremely important issues to later chapters. In particular, the focus of this chapter is on representing what is sometimes called the **literal meaning** of sentences. By this, we have in mind representations that are closely tied to the conventional meanings of the words that are used to create them, and that do not reflect much of the context in which they occur. The shortcomings of such representations with respect to phenomena such as idioms and metaphor will be discussed in the next two chapters, while the role of context in ascertaining the deeper meaning of sentences will be covered in Chs. 20 and 23.

There are four major parts to this chapter. Section 17.1 explores some of the key computational requirements for what we need in a meaning representation language. Section 17.2 then discusses some of the ways that languages are structured to convey meaning. Section 17.3 describes how we can more formally specify the meanings of our meaning representations. Section 17.4 then provides an introduction to First Order Logic, which has historically been the primary technique used to investigate issues in natural language semantics.

17.1 COMPUTATIONAL DESIDERATA FOR REPRESENTATIONS

We begin by considering the issue of why meaning representations are needed and what they should do for us. To focus this discussion, we will consider in more detail the task of giving advice about restaurants to tourists. In this discussion, we will assume that we have a computer system that accepts spoken language queries from tourists and construct appropriate responses by using a knowledge base of relevant domain knowledge. A series of examples will serve to introduce some of the basic requirements that a meaning representation must fulfill, and some of the complications that inevitably arise in the process of designing such meaning representations. In each of these examples, we will examine the role that the representation of the meaning of the request must play in the process of satisfying it.

17.1.1 Verifiability

Let us begin by considering the following simple question:

(17.1) Does Maharani serve vegetarian food?

This example illustrates the most basic requirement for a meaning representation: it must be possible to use the representation to determine the relationship between the meaning of a sentence and the world as we know it. In other words, we need to be able to determine the truth of our representations. The most straightforward way to implement this notion is make it possible for a system to compare, or *match*, the representation of the meaning of an input against the representations in its **knowledge base**, its store of information about its world.

KNOWLEDGE BASE

In this example, let us assume that the meaning of this question contains, as a component, the meaning underlying the proposition *Maharani serves vegetarian food*. For now, we will simply gloss this representation as:

Serves(Maharani, VegetarianFood)

It is this representation of the input that will be matched against the knowledge base of facts about a set of restaurants. If the system finds a representation matching the input proposition in its knowledge base, it can return an affirmative answer. Otherwise, it must either say *No*, if its knowledge of local restaurants is complete, or say that it does not know if there is reason to believe that its knowledge is incomplete.

VERIFIABILITY

This notion is known as **verifiability**, and concerns a system's ability to compare the state of affairs described by a representation to the state of affairs in some world as modeled in a knowledge base.

17.1.2 Unambiguous Representations

The domain of semantics, like all the other domains we have studied, is subject to ambiguity. Specifically, single linguistic inputs can legitimately have different meaning representations assigned to them based on the circumstances in which they occur.

Consider the following example from the BERP corpus:

(17.2) I wanna eat someplace that's close to ICSI.

Given the allowable argument structures for the verb *eat*, this sentence can either mean that the speaker wants to eat *at* some nearby location, or under a Godzilla as speaker interpretation, the speaker may want to devour some nearby location. The answer generated by the system for this request will depend on which interpretation is chosen as the correct one.

Since ambiguities such as this abound in all genres of all languages, some means of determining that certain interpretations are preferable (or alternatively less preferable) than others is needed. The various linguistic phenomena that give rise to such ambiguities, and the techniques that can be employed to deal with them, will be discussed in detail in the next four chapters.

Our concern in this chapter, however, is with the status of our meaning representations with respect to ambiguity, and not with the means by which we might arrive at correct interpretations. Since we reason about, and act upon, the semantic content of linguistic inputs, the final representation of an input's meaning should be free from any ambiguity. Therefore, regardless of any ambiguity in the raw input, it is critical that a meaning representation language support representations that have a single unambiguous interpretation¹.

VAGUENESS

A concept closely related to ambiguity is **vagueness**. Like ambiguity, vague-

¹ This does not preclude the use of intermediate semantic representations that maintain some level of ambiguity on the way to a single unambiguous form. Examples of such representations will be discussed in Ch. 18.

ness can make it difficult to determine what to do with a particular input based on its meaning representation. Vagueness, however, does not give rise to multiple representations.

Consider the following request as an example:

(17.3) I want to eat Italian food.

While the use of the phrase *Italian food* may provide enough information for a restaurant advisor to provide reasonable recommendations, it is nevertheless quite *vague* as to what the user really wants to eat. Therefore, a vague representation of the meaning of this phrase may be appropriate for some purposes, while a more specific representation may be needed for other purposes. It will, therefore, be advantageous for a meaning representation language to support representations that maintain a certain level of vagueness. Note that it is not always easy to distinguish ambiguity from vagueness. Zwicky and Sadock (1975) provide a useful set of tests that can be used as diagnostics.

17.1.3 Canonical Form

The notion that single sentences can be assigned multiple meanings leads to the related phenomenon of distinct inputs that should be assigned the same meaning representation. Consider the following alternative ways of expressing example (17.1):

(17.4) Does Maharani have vegetarian dishes?

(17.5) Do they have vegetarian food at Maharani?

(17.6) Are vegetarian dishes served at Maharani?

(17.7) Does Maharani serve vegetarian fare?

Given that these alternatives use different words and have widely varying syntactic analyses, it would not be unreasonable to expect them to have substantially different meaning representations. Such a situation would, however, have undesirable consequences for our matching approach to determining the truth of our representations. If the system's knowledge base contains only a single representation of the fact in question, then the representations underlying all but one of our alternatives will fail to produce a match. We could, of course, store all possible alternative representations of the same fact in the knowledge base, but this would lead to an enormous number of problems related to keeping such a knowledge base consistent.

The way out of this dilemma is motivated by the fact that since the answers given for each of these alternatives should be the same in all situations, we might say that they all mean the same thing, at least for the purposes of giving restaurant recommendations. In other words, at least in this domain, we can legitimately consider assigning the same meaning representation to the propositions underlying

each of these requests. Taking such an approach would guarantee that our matching scheme for answering Yes-No questions will still work.

CANONICAL FORM

The notion that inputs that mean the same thing should have the same meaning representation is known as the doctrine of **canonical form**. This approach greatly simplifies various reasoning tasks since systems need only deal with a single meaning representation for a potentially wide range of expressions.

Canonical form does, of course, complicate the task of semantic analysis. To see this, note that the alternatives given above use completely different words and syntax to refer to vegetarian fare and to what restaurants do with it. More specifically, to assign the same representation to all of these requests our system will have to conclude that *vegetarian fare*, *vegetarian dishes* and *vegetarian food* refer to the same thing in this context, that the use here of *having* and *serving* are similarly equivalent, and that the different syntactic parses underlying these requests are all compatible with the same meaning representation.

Being able to assign the same representation to such diverse inputs is a tall order. Fortunately there are some systematic meaning relationships among word senses and among grammatical constructions that can be exploited to make this task tractable. Consider the issue of the meanings of the words *food*, *dish* and *fare* in these examples. A little introspection, or a glance at a dictionary, reveals that these words have a fair number of distinct uses. Fortunately, it also reveals that there is at least one sense that is shared among them all. If a system has the ability to choose that shared sense, then an identical meaning representation can be assigned to the phrases containing these words.

WORD SENSES

WORD SENSE
DISAMBIGUATION

In general, we say that these words all have various **word senses** and that some of the senses are synonymous with one another. The process of choosing the right sense in context is called **word sense disambiguation**, or word sense tagging by analogy to part-of-speech tagging. The topics of synonymy, sense tagging, and a host of other topics related to word meanings will be covered in Chs. 17 and 18. Suffice it to say here that the fact that inputs may use different words does not preclude the assignment of identical meanings to them.

Just as there are systematic relationships among the meanings of different words, there are similar relationships related to the role that syntactic analyses play in assigning meanings to sentences. Specifically, alternative syntactic analyses often have meanings that are, if not identical, at least systematically related to one another. Consider the following pair of examples:

- (17.8) Maharani serves vegetarian dishes.
- (17.9) Vegetarian dishes are served by Maharani.

Despite the different placement of the arguments to *serve* in these examples, we can still assign *Maharani* and *vegetarian dishes* to the same roles in both of these

examples because of our knowledge of the relationship between active and passive sentence constructions. In particular, we can use knowledge of where grammatical subjects and direct objects appear in these constructions to assign *Maharani*, to the role of the server, and *vegetarian dishes* to the role of thing being served in both of these examples, despite the fact that they appear in different surface locations. The precise role of the grammar in the construction of meaning representations will be covered in Ch. 18.

17.1.4 Inference and Variables

Continuing with the topic of the computational purposes that meaning representations should serve, we should consider more complex requests such as the following:

(17.10) Can vegetarians eat at Maharani?

Here, it would be a mistake to invoke canonical form to force our system to assign the same representation to this request as for the previous examples. The fact that this request results in the same answer as the others arises not because they mean the same thing, but because there is a commonsense connection between what vegetarians eat and what vegetarian restaurants serve. This is a fact about the world and not a fact about any particular kind of linguistic regularity. This implies that no approach based on canonical form and simple matching will give us an appropriate answer to this request. What is needed is a systematic way to connect the meaning representation of this request with the facts about the world as they are represented in a knowledge base.

INFERENCE

We will use the term **inference** to refer generically to a system's ability to draw valid conclusions based on the meaning representation of inputs and its store of background knowledge. It must be possible for the system to draw conclusions about the truth of propositions that are not explicitly represented in the knowledge base, but are nevertheless logically derivable from the propositions that are present.

Now consider the following somewhat more complex request:

(17.11) I'd like to find a restaurant where I can get vegetarian food.

Unlike our previous examples, this request does not make reference to any particular restaurant. The user is stating that they would like information about an unknown and unnamed entity that is a restaurant that serves vegetarian food. Since this request does not mention any particular restaurant, the kind of simple matching-based approach we have been advocating is not going to work. Rather, answering this request requires a more complex kind of matching that involves the use of variables. We can gloss a representation containing such variables as follows:

Serves(x, VegetarianFood)

Matching such a proposition succeeds only if the variable x can be replaced by some known object in the knowledge base in such a way that the entire proposition will then match. The concept that is substituted for the variable can then be used to fulfill the user's request. Of course, this simple example only hints at the issues involved in the use of such variables. Suffice it to say that linguistic inputs contain many instances of all kinds of indefinite references and it is therefore critical for any meaning representation language to be able to handle this kind of expression.

17.1.5 Expressiveness

Finally, to be useful a meaning representation scheme must be expressive enough to handle an extremely wide range of subject matter. The ideal situation, of course, would be to have a single meaning representation language that could adequately represent the meaning of any sensible natural language utterance. Although this is probably too much to expect from any single representational system, Section 17.4 will show that First-Order Logic is expressive enough to handle quite a lot of what needs to be represented.

17.2 MEANING STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE

MEANING
STRUCTURE OF
LANGUAGE

The previous section focused on some of the purposes that meaning representations must serve, without saying much about what we will call the **meaning structure of language**. By this, we have in mind the various methods by which human languages convey meaning. These include a variety of conventional form-meaning associations, word-order regularities, tense systems, conjunctions and quantifiers, and a fundamental predicate-argument structure. The remainder of this section focuses exclusively on this last notion of a predicate-argument structure, which is the mechanism that has had the greatest practical influence on the nature of meaning representation languages. The remaining topics will be addressed in Ch. 18 where the primary focus will be on how they contribute to how meaning representations are assembled, rather than on the nature of the representations.

17.2.1 Predicate-Argument Structure

Human languages have a form of predicate-argument arrangement at the core of their semantic structure. To a first approximation, this predicate-argument structure asserts that specific relationships, or dependencies, hold among the various concepts underlying the constituent words and phrases that make up sentences. It is this underlying structure that permits the creation of a single composite meaning

representation from the meanings of the various parts of an input. One of the most important jobs of a grammar is to help organize this predicate-argument structure. Correspondingly, it is critical that our meaning representation languages support the predicate-argument structures presented to us by language.

We have already seen the beginnings of this concept in our discussion of verb complements in Chs. 11 and 15. There we saw that verbs dictate specific constraints on the number, grammatical category, and location of the phrases that are expected to accompany them in syntactic structures. To briefly review this idea, consider the following examples:

- (17.12) I want Italian food.
 (17.13) I want to spend less than five dollars.
 (17.14) I want it to be close by here.

These examples can be classified as having one of the following three syntactic argument frames:

NP want NP

NP want Inf-VP

NP want NP Inf-VP

These syntactic frames specify the number, position and syntactic category of the arguments that are expected to accompany a verb. For example, the frame for the variety of *want* that appears in example (17.12) specifies the following facts:

- There are two arguments to this predicate.
- Both arguments must be *NPs*.
- The first argument is pre-verbal and plays the role of the subject.
- The second argument is post-verbal and plays the role of the direct object.

As we have shown in previous chapters, this kind of information is quite valuable in capturing a variety of important facts about syntax. By analyzing easily observable semantic information associated with these frames, we can also gain considerable insight into our meaning representations. We will begin by considering two extensions of these frames into the semantic realm: semantic roles and semantic restrictions on these roles.

The notion of a semantic role can be understood by looking at the similarities among the arguments in examples (17.12) through (17.14). In each of these cases, the pre-verbal argument always plays the role of the entity doing the wanting, while the post-verbal argument plays the role of the concept that is *wanted*. By noticing these regularities and labeling them accordingly, we can associate the surface arguments of a verb with a set of discrete roles in its underlying semantics.

LINKING

More generally, we can say that verb subcategorization frames allow the **linking** of

arguments in the surface structure with the semantic roles these arguments play in the underlying semantic representation of an input. The study of roles associated with specific verbs and across classes of verbs is usually referred to as **thematic role** or **case role** analysis and will be studied more fully in Ch. 19.

THEMATIC ROLE

CASE ROLE

The notion of semantic restrictions arises directly from these semantic roles. Returning to examples 17.12 through 17.14, we can see that it is not merely the case that each initial noun phrase argument will be the *wanter* but that only certain kinds, or *categories*, of concepts can play the role of *wanter* in any straightforward manner. Specifically, *want* restricts the constituents appearing as the first argument to those whose underlying concepts can actually partake in a wanting. Traditionally, this notion is referred to as a **selectional restriction**. Through the use of these selectional restrictions, verbs can specify semantic restrictions on their arguments.

SELECTIONAL
RESTRICTION

Before leaving this topic, we should note that verbs are by no means the only objects in a grammar that can carry a predicate-argument structure. Consider the following phrases from the BERP corpus:

(17.15) an Italian restaurant under fifteen dollars

In this example, the meaning representation associated with the preposition *under* can be seen as having something like the following structure:

Under(ItalianRestaurant, \$15)

In other words, prepositions can be characterized as two-argument predicates where the first argument is an object that is being placed in some relation to the second argument.

Another non-verb based predicate-argument structure is illustrated in the following example:

(17.16) Make a reservation for this evening for a table for two persons at 8.

Here, the predicate-argument structure is based on the concept underlying the noun *reservation*, rather than *make*, the main verb in the phrase. This example gives rise to a four argument predicate structure like the following:

Reservation(Hearer, Today, 8PM, 2)

This discussion makes it clear that any useful meaning representation language must be organized in a way that supports the specification of semantic predicate-argument structures. Specifically, it must include support for the kind of semantic information that languages present:

- variable arity predicate-argument structures
- the semantic labeling of arguments to predicates
- the statement of semantic constraints on the fillers of argument roles

17.3 MODEL-THEORETIC SEMANTICS

The last two sections focused on various desiderata for meaning representations and on some of the ways in which natural languages convey meaning. We haven't said much formally about what it is about meaning representation languages that allows them to do all the things we want them to. In particular, we might like to have some kind of guarantee that these representations can do the work that we require of them: bridge the gap from merely formal representations to representations that tell us something about some state of affairs in the world.

MODEL

To see how we might provide such a guarantee, let's start with the basic notions shared by most meaning representation schemes. What they all have in common is the ability to represent **objects**, **properties of objects** and **relations among objects**. This point of view can be formalized via the notion of a **model**. The basic idea is that a model is a formal construct that stands for the particular state of affairs in the world that we're trying to represent. Expressions in a meaning representation language will then be mapped in a systematic way to the elements of the model. If the model accurately captures the facts we're interested in concerning some state of affairs in the world, then a systematic mapping between the meaning representation and model provides the necessary bridge between the meaning representation and world being considered. As we'll see, models provide a surprisingly simple and powerful way to ground the expressions in meaning representation languages.

NON-LOGICAL
VOCABULARY

LOGICAL
VOCABULARY

Before we start let's introduce some terminology. The vocabulary of a meaning representation consists of two parts: the non-logical vocabulary and the logical vocabulary. The **non-logical vocabulary** consists of the open-ended set of names for the objects, properties and relations that make up the world we're trying to represent. These appear in various schemes as predicates, nodes, labels on links, or labels in slots in frames. The **logical vocabulary** consists of the closed set of symbols, operators, quantifiers, links, etc. that provide the formal means for composing expressions in a given meaning representation language.

DOMAIN

We'll start by requiring that each element of the non-logical vocabulary of a meaning representation have a **denotation** in the model. By denotation, we simply mean that every element of the non-logical vocabulary corresponds to a fixed well-defined part of the model. Let's start with objects, the most basic notion in most representational schemes. The **domain** of a model is simply the set of objects that are part of the application, or state of affairs, being represented. Each distinct concept, category or individual in an application denotes a unique element in the domain. A domain is therefore formally a set. Note that it isn't the case that every element of the domain have a corresponding concept in our meaning representation; it's perfectly acceptable to have domain elements that aren't mentioned or

conceived of in the meaning representation. Nor do we require that elements of the domain have a single denoting concept in the meaning representation; a given element in the domain might have several distinct representations denoting it, such as *Mary*, *WifeOf(Abe)*, or *MotherOf(Robert)*.

We can capture properties of objects in a model by denoting those domain elements that have the property in question; that is, properties denote sets. Similarly, relations among objects denote sets of ordered lists, or tuples, of domain elements that take part in the corresponding relations. This approach to properties and relations is thus an **extensional** one; the denotation of properties like *red* is the set of things we think are red, the denotation of a relation like *Married* is simply the set of pairs of domain elements that are married. To summarize:

- Objects denote *elements* of the domain
- Properties denote *sets of elements* of the domain
- Relations denote *sets of tuples of elements* of the domain

There is one additional element that we need to make this scheme work. We need a mapping that systematically gets us from our meaning representation to the corresponding denotations. More formally, we need a function that maps from the non-logical vocabulary of our meaning representation to the proper denotations in the model. We'll call such a mapping an **interpretation**.

INTERPRETATION

To make these notions more concrete, let's return to the realm of restaurants we introduced in Ch. 4. Assume that our application concerns a particular set of restaurant patrons and restaurants, various facts about the likes and dislikes of the patrons, and facts about the restaurants such as their cuisine, typical cost, and noise level.

To begin populating our domain, \mathcal{D} , let's assume that in the current state of affairs we're dealing with four patrons designated by the non-logical symbols *Matthew*, *Franco*, *Katie* and *Caroline*. These four symbols will denote 4 unique domain elements. We'll use the constants *a*, *b*, *c* and *d* to stand for these domain elements. Note that we're deliberately using meaningless, non-mnemonic names for our domain elements to emphasize the fact that whatever it is that we know about these entities has to come from the formal properties of the model and not from the names of the symbols. Continuing, let's assume that our application includes three restaurants, designated as *Frasca*, *Med* and *Rio* in our meaning representation, that denote the domain elements *e*, *f* and *g*. Finally, let's assume that we're dealing with the three cuisines *Italian*, *Mexican*, and *Eclectic*, denoting *i*, *j*, and *k* in our model.

Having populated the domain, let's move on to the properties and relations we believe to be true in this particular state of affairs. Let's assume that in our application we need to represent some properties of restaurants such as the fact that

Domain	$\mathcal{D} = \{a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j\}$
Matthew, Franco, Katie and Caroline	a, b, c, d
Frasca, Med, Rio	e, f, g
ItalianCuisine, MexicanCuisne, EclecticCuisine	h, i, j
Noisy	$Noisy = \{e, f, g\}$
Frasca, Med and Rio are noisy	
Likes	$Likes = \{\langle a, f \rangle, \langle c, f \rangle, \langle c, g \rangle, \langle b, e \rangle, \langle d, f \rangle, \langle d, g \rangle\}$
Matthew likes the Med	
Katie likes the Med and Rio	
Franco likes Frasca	
Caroline likes the Med and Rio	
Serves	$Serves = \{\langle e, j \rangle, \langle f, i \rangle, \langle e, h \rangle\}$
Med serves eclectic	
Rio serves Mexican	
Frasca serves Italian	

Figure 17.2 A model of the restaurant world.

some are noisy or expensive. Properties like *Noisy* denote the subset of restaurants from our domain that are known to be noisy. Two-place relational notions, such as which restaurants individual patrons *Like*, denote ordered pairs, or tuples, of the objects from the domain. Similarly, since we decided to represent cuisines as objects in our model, we can also capture which restaurants *Serve* which cuisines as a set of tuples. One particular state of affairs using this scheme is given in Fig. 17.2.

Given this simple scheme, we can ground the meaning of pretty much any of the representations shown earlier in Fig. ?? by simply consulting the appropriate denotations in the corresponding model. A representation claiming, for example, that *Matthew likes the Rio*, or that the *The Med serves Italian* can be evaluated by mapping the objects in the meaning representations to their corresponding domain elements, and any links, predicates, or slots in the meaning representation to the appropriate relations in the model. More concretely, a representation asserting that *Matthew likes Frasca* can be verified by first using our interpretation function to map the symbol *Matthew* to its denotation a , *Frasca* to e , and the *Likes* relation to the appropriate set of tuples. We then simply check that set of tuples for the presence of the tuple $\langle a, e \rangle$. If, as it is in this case, the tuple is present in the model

then we can conclude that *Matthew likes Frasca* is true, and if it isn't we can't.

This is all pretty much straightforward, we're simply using sets and operations on sets to ground the expressions in our meaning representations. Of course, the more interesting part comes when we consider more complex examples such as the following:

- (17.17) Katie likes the Rio and Matthew likes the Med.
- (17.18) Katie and Caroline like the same restaurants.
- (17.19) Franco likes noisy, expensive restaurants.
- (17.20) Not everybody likes Frasca.

Clearly, our simple scheme for grounding the meaning of representations is not adequate for examples such as these. Plausible meaning representations for these examples will not map directly to individual entities, properties or relations. Instead, they involve complications such as conjunctions, equality, quantified variables and negations. To assess whether or not these statements are consistent with our model we'll have to tear them apart, assess the parts and then determine the meaning of the whole from the meaning of the parts according to the details of how the whole is assembled.

Consider the first example given above. A typical meaning representation for examples like this will include two distinct propositions expressing the individual patron's preferences, conjoined with some kind of implicit or explicit conjunction operator. Obviously, our model doesn't have a relation that encodes the pairwise preferences for all of the patrons and restaurants in our model, nor does it need to. We know from our model that *Matthew likes the Med* and separately that *Katie likes the Rio* (that is, we know that the tuples $\langle a, f \rangle$ and $\langle c, g \rangle$ are members of the set denoted by the *Likes* relation.) All we really need to know is how to deal with the semantics of the conjunction operator. If we assume the simplest possible semantics for the English word *and*, the whole statement is true if it is the case each of the components is true in our model. In this case, both components are true since the appropriate tuples are present and therefore the sentence as a whole is true.

What we've done implicitly in this example is to provide what is called a **truth-conditional semantics** for the assumed conjunction operator in some meaning representation. That is, we've provided a method for determining the truth of a complex expression from the meanings of the parts (by consulting a model) and the meaning of an operator by essentially consulting a truth-table. The various representations that populate Fig. 17.1 are truth-conditional to the extent that they give a formal specification as to how we can assess the meaning of complex sentences from the meaning of their parts. In particular, we'll need to know the semantics of the entire **logical vocabulary** of the meaning representation scheme being used.

Note that although the details of how this happens is dependent on details of the particular meaning representation being used, it should be clear that assessing the truth conditions of examples like these involves nothing beyond the simple set operations we've been discussing. We'll return to these issues in the next section where we discuss them in the context of the semantics of First Order Logic.

17.4 FIRST-ORDER LOGIC

First-Order Logic (FOL) is a flexible, well-understood, and computationally tractable approach to the representation of knowledge that satisfies many of the desiderata given in Sections 17.1 and 17.2 for a meaning representation language. Specifically, it provides a sound computational basis for the verifiability, inference, and expressiveness requirements, and as we'll see a sound model-theoretic semantics.

However, the most attractive feature of FOL is the fact that it makes very few specific commitments as to how things ought to be represented. As we will see, the specific commitments it does make are ones that are fairly easy to live with and are shared by many of the schemes mentioned earlier; the represented world consists of objects, properties of objects, and relations among objects.

The remainder of this section first provides an introduction to the basic syntax and semantics of FOL, and then describes the application of FOL to a number of linguistically relevant topics. Section 17.7 then discusses the connections between FOL and some of the other representations shown earlier in Figure 17.1.

17.4.1 Elements of First Order Logic


We will explore FOL in a bottom-up fashion by first examining its various atomic elements and then showing how they can be composed to create larger meaning representations. Fig. 17.3, which provides a complete context-free grammar for the particular syntax of FOL that we will be using, will be our roadmap for this section.

TERM

Let's begin by examining the notion of a **Term**, the FOL device for representing objects. As can be seen from Figure 17.3, FOL provides three ways to represent these basic building blocks: constants, functions, and variables. Each of these devices can be thought of as a way of naming, or pointing to, an object in the world under consideration.

CONSTANTS

Constants in FOL refer to specific objects in the world being described. Such constants are conventionally depicted as either single capitalized letters such as *A* and *B* or single capitalized words that are often reminiscent of proper nouns such as *Maharani* and *Harry*. Like programming language constants, FOL constants refer



to exactly one object. Objects can, however, have multiple constants that refer to them.

FUNCTIONS

Functions in FOPC correspond to concepts that are often expressed in English as genitives such as *Frasca's location*. A FOL translation of such an expression might look like the following.

LocationOf(*Frasca*)

FOPC functions are syntactically the same as single argument predicates. It is important to remember, however, that while they have the appearance of predicates they are in fact *Terms* in that they refer to unique objects. Functions provide a convenient way to refer to specific objects without having to associate a named constant with them. This is particularly convenient in cases where many named objects, like restaurants, will have a unique concept such as a location associated

with them.

VARIABLE

The notion of a **variable** is our final FOPC mechanism for referring to objects. Variables, which are normally depicted as single lower-case letters, give us the ability to make assertions and draw inferences about objects without having to make reference to any particular named object. This ability to make statements about anonymous objects comes in two flavors: making statements about a particular unknown object and making statements about all the objects in some arbitrary world of objects. We will return to the topic of variables after we have presented quantifiers, the elements of FOPC that will make them useful.

Now that we have the means to refer to objects, we can move on to the FOPC mechanisms that are used to state relations that hold among objects. As one might guess from its name, FOPC is organized around the notion of the predicate. Predicates are symbols that refer to, or name, the relations that hold among some fixed number of objects in a given domain. Returning to the example introduced informally in Section 17.1, a reasonable FOPC representation for *Maharani serves vegetarian food* might look like the following formula:

$$\text{Serves}(\text{Maharani}, \text{VegetarianFood})$$

This FOPC sentence asserts that *Serves*, a two-place predicate, holds between the objects denoted by the constants *Maharani* and *VegetarianFood*.

A somewhat different use of predicates is illustrated by the following typical representation for a sentence like *Maharani is a restaurant*:

$$\text{Restaurant}(\text{Maharani})$$

This is an example of a one-place predicate that is used, not to relate multiple objects, but rather to assert a property of a single object. In this case, it encodes the category membership of *Maharani*. We should note that while this is a commonplace way to deal with categories it is probably not the most useful. Section 17.5 will return to the topic of the representation of categories.

With the ability to refer to objects, to assert facts about objects, and to relate objects to one another, we have the ability to create rudimentary composite representations. These representations correspond to the atomic formula level in Figure 17.3. Recall that this ability to create composite meaning representations was one of the core components of the meaning structure of language described in Section 17.2.

LOGICAL CONNECTIVES

This ability to compose complex representations is not limited to the use of single predicates. Larger composite representations can also be put together through the use of **logical connectives**. As can be seen from Figure 17.3, logical connectives give us the ability to create larger representations by conjoining logical formulas using one of three operators. Consider, for example, the following BERP sentence and one possible representation for it:

- (17.21) I only have five dollars and I don't have a lot of time.

$$\text{Have}(\text{Speaker}, \text{FiveDollars}) \wedge \neg \text{Have}(\text{Speaker}, \text{LotOfTime})$$

The semantic representation for this example is built up in a straightforward way from semantics of the individual clauses through the use of the \wedge and \neg operators. Note that the recursive nature of the grammar in Figure 17.3 allows an infinite number of logical formulas to be created through the use of these connectives. Thus as with syntax, we have the ability to create an infinite number of representations using a finite device.

17.4.2 The Semantics of First Order Logic

The various objects, properties, and relations represented in a FOPC knowledge base acquire their meanings by virtue of their correspondence to objects, properties, and relations out in the external world being modeled by the knowledge base. FOPC sentences can, therefore, be assigned a value of *True* or *False* based on whether the propositions they encode are in accord with the world or not.

Consider the following example:

- (17.22) Ay Caramba is near ICSI.

Capturing the meaning of this example in FOPC involves identifying the *Terms* and *Predicates* that correspond to the various grammatical elements in the sentence, and creating logical formulas that capture the relations implied by the words and syntax of the sentence. For this example, such an effort might yield something like the following:

$$\text{Near}(\text{LocationOf}(\text{AyCaramba}), \text{LocationOf}(\text{ICSI}))$$

The meaning of this logical formula then arises from the relationship between the terms *LocationOf*(AyCaramba), *LocationOf*(ICSI), the predicate *Near*, and the objects and relation they correspond to in the world being modeled. Specifically, this sentence can be assigned a value of *True* or *False* based on whether or not the real Ay Caramba is actually close to ICSI or not. Of course, since our computers rarely have direct access to the outside world we have to rely on some other means to determine the truth of formulas like this one.

For our current purposes, we will adopt what is known as a database semantics for determining the truth of our logical formulas. Operationally, atomic formulas are taken to be true if they are literally present in the knowledge base or if they can be inferred from other formula that are in the knowledge base. The interpretations of formulas involving logical connectives is based on the meaning of the components in the formulas combined with the meanings of the connectives they contain. Fig. 17.4 gives interpretations for each of the logical operators shown in Figure 17.3.

P	Q	$\neg P$	$P \wedge Q$	$P \vee Q$	$P \Rightarrow Q$
<i>False</i>	<i>False</i>	<i>True</i>	<i>False</i>	<i>False</i>	<i>True</i>
<i>False</i>	<i>True</i>	<i>True</i>	<i>False</i>	<i>True</i>	<i>True</i>
<i>True</i>	<i>False</i>	<i>False</i>	<i>False</i>	<i>True</i>	<i>False</i>
<i>True</i>	<i>True</i>	<i>False</i>	<i>True</i>	<i>True</i>	<i>True</i>

Figure 17.4 Truth table giving the semantics of the various logical connectives.

The semantics of the \wedge (and), and \neg (not) operators are fairly straightforward, and are correlated with at least some of the senses of their corresponding English terms. However, it is worth pointing out that the \vee (or) operator is not disjunctive in the same way that the corresponding English word is, and that the \Rightarrow (implies) operator is only loosely based on any commonsense notions of implication or causation. As we will see in more detail in Section 17.5, in most cases it is safest to rely directly on the entries in the truth table, rather than on intuitions arising from the names of the operators.

17.4.3 Variables and Quantifiers

QUANTIFIERS

We now have all the machinery necessary to return to our earlier discussion of variables. As noted above, variables are used in two ways in FOPC: to refer to particular anonymous objects and to refer generically to all objects in a collection. These two uses are made possible through the use of operators known as **quantifiers**. The two operators that are basic to FOPC are the existential quantifier, which is denoted \exists , and is pronounced as “there exists”, and the universal quantifier, which is denoted \forall , and is pronounced as “for all”.

The need for an existentially quantified variable is often signaled by the presence of an indefinite noun phrase in English. Consider the following example:

(17.23) a restaurant that serves Mexican food near ICSI.

Here reference is being made to an anonymous object of a specified category with particular properties. The following would be a reasonable representation of the meaning of such a phrase:

$$\begin{aligned} &\exists x \text{Restaurant}(x) \\ &\quad \wedge \text{Serves}(x, \text{MexicanFood}) \\ &\quad \wedge \text{Near}(\text{LocationOf}(x), \text{LocationOf}(\text{ICSI})) \end{aligned}$$

The existential quantifier at the head of this sentence instructs us on how to interpret the variable x in the context of this sentence. Informally, it says that for this sentence to be true there must be at least one object such that if we were to substitute it for the variable x , the resulting sentence would be true. For example,

if *AyCaramba* is a Mexican restaurant near ICSI, then substituting *AyCaramba* for *x* results in the following logical formula:

$$\begin{aligned} & Restaurant(AyCaramba) \\ & \wedge Serves(AyCaramba, MexicanFood) \\ & \wedge Near((LocationOf(AyCaramba), LocationOf(ICSI))) \end{aligned}$$

Based on the semantics of the \wedge operator, this sentence will be true if all of its three component atomic formulas are true. These in turn will be true if they are either present in the system's knowledge base or can be inferred from other facts in the knowledge base.

The use of the universal quantifier also has an interpretation based on substitution of known objects for variables. The substitution semantics for the universal quantifier takes the expression *for all* quite literally; the \forall operator states that for the logical formula in question to be true the substitution of *any* object in the knowledge base for the universally quantified variable should result in a true formula. This is in marked contrast to the \exists operator which only insists on a single valid substitution for the sentence to be true.

Consider the following example:

(17.24) All vegetarian restaurants serve vegetarian food.

A reasonable representation for this sentence would be something like the following:

$$\forall x VegetarianRestaurant(x) \Rightarrow Serves(x, VegetarianFood)$$

For this sentence to be true, it must be the case that every substitution of a known object for *x* must result in a sentence that is true. We can divide up the set of all possible substitutions into the set of objects consisting of vegetarian restaurants and the set consisting of everything else. Let us first consider the case where the substituted object actually is a vegetarian restaurant; one such substitution would result in the following sentence:

$$\begin{aligned} & VegetarianRestaurant(Maharani) \\ & \Rightarrow Serves(Maharani, VegetarianFood) \end{aligned}$$

If we assume that we know that the consequent clause,

$$Serves(Maharani, VegetarianFood)$$

is true then this sentence as a whole must be true. Both the antecedent and the consequent have the value *True* and, therefore, according to the first two rows of Fig. 17.4 the sentence itself can have the value *True*. This result will, of course, be the same for all possible substitutions of *Terms* representing vegetarian restaurants for *x*.

Remember, however, that for this sentence to be true it must be true for all possible substitutions. What happens when we consider a substitution from the set of objects that are not vegetarian restaurants? Consider the substitution of a non-vegetarian restaurant such as *Ay Caramba's* for the variable x :

$$\begin{aligned} \text{VegetarianRestaurant}(\text{AyCaramba}) \\ \Rightarrow \text{Serves}(\text{AyCaramba}, \text{VegetarianFood}) \end{aligned}$$

Since the antecedent of the implication is *False*, we can determine from Fig. 17.4 that the sentence is always *True*, again satisfying the \forall constraint.

Note, that it may still be the case that *Ay Caramba* serves vegetarian food without actually being a vegetarian restaurant. Note also, that despite our choice of examples, there are no implied categorical restrictions on the objects that can be substituted for x by this kind of reasoning. In other words, there is no restriction of x to restaurants or concepts related to them. Consider the following substitution:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{VegetarianRestaurant}(\text{Carburetor}) \\ \Rightarrow \text{Serves}(\text{Carburetor}, \text{VegetarianFood}) \end{aligned}$$

Here the antecedent is still false and hence the rule remains true under this kind of irrelevant substitution.

To review, variables in logical formulas must be either existentially (\exists) or universally (\forall) quantified. To satisfy an existentially quantified variable, there must be at least one substitution that results in a true sentence. Sentences with universally quantified variables must be true under all possible substitutions.

17.4.4 Inference

One of the most important desiderata given in Section 17.1 for a meaning representation language is that it should support inference—the ability to add valid new propositions to a knowledge base, or to determine the truth of propositions not explicitly contained within a knowledge base. This section briefly discusses **modus ponens**, the most important inference method provided by FOPC. Applications of modus ponens will be discussed in Ch. 21.

MODUS PONENS

Modus ponens is a familiar form of inference that corresponds to what is informally known as *if-then* reasoning. We can abstractly define modus ponens as follows, where α and β should be taken as FOPC formulas:

$$\frac{\alpha \quad \alpha \Rightarrow \beta}{\beta}$$

In general, schemas like this indicate that the formula below the line can be inferred from the formulas above the line by some form of inference. Modus ponens simply states that if the left-hand side of an implication rule is present in the knowledge

base, then the right-hand side of the rule can be inferred. In the following discussions, we will refer to the left-hand side of an implication as the antecedent, and the right-hand side as the consequent.

As an example of a typical use of modus ponens, consider the following example, which uses a rule from the last section:

(17.25)

$$\frac{\text{VegetarianRestaurant}(\text{Rudys}) \quad \forall x \text{VegetarianRestaurant}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Serves}(x, \text{VegetarianFood})}{\text{Serves}(\text{Rudys}, \text{VegetarianFood})}$$

Here, the formula $\text{VegetarianRestaurant}(\text{Rudys})$ matches the antecedent of the rule, thus allowing us to use modus ponens to conclude $\text{Serves}(\text{Rudys}, \text{VegetarianFood})$.

FORWARD CHAINING

Modus ponens is typically put to practical use in one of two ways: forward chaining and backward chaining. In **forward chaining** systems, modus ponens is used in precisely the manner just described. As individual facts are added to the knowledge base, modus ponens is used to fire all applicable implication rules. In this kind of arrangement, as soon as a new fact is added to the knowledge base, all applicable implication rules are found and applied, each resulting in the addition of new facts to the knowledge base. These new propositions in turn can be used to fire implication rules applicable to them. The process continues until no further facts can be deduced.

PRODUCTION SYSTEMS

The forward chaining approach has the advantage that facts will be present in the knowledge base when needed, since in a sense all inference is performed in advance. This can substantially reduce the time needed to answer subsequent queries since they should all amount to simple lookups. The disadvantage of this approach is that facts may be inferred and stored that will never be needed. **Production systems**, which are heavily used in cognitive modeling work, are forward chaining inference systems augmented with additional control knowledge that governs which rules are to be fired.

BACKWARD CHAINING

In **backward chaining**, modus ponens is run in reverse to prove specific propositions, called queries. The first step is to see if the query formula is true by determining if it is present in the knowledge base. If it is not, then the next step is to search for applicable implication rules present in the knowledge base. An applicable rule is one where the consequent of the rule matches the query formula. If there are any such rules, then the query can be proved if the antecedent of any one of them can be shown to be true. Not surprisingly, this can be performed recursively by backward chaining on the antecedent as a new query. The **Prolog** programming language is a backward chaining system that implements this strategy.

To see how this works, let's assume that we have been asked to verify the truth of the proposition $Serves(Rudys, VegetarianFood)$, assuming the facts given above the line in (17.25). Since it is not present in the knowledge base, a search for an applicable rule is initiated that results in the rule given above. After substituting, the constant $Rudys$ for the variable x , our next task is to prove the antecedent of the rule, $VegetarianRestaurant(Rudys)$, which of course is one of the facts we are given.

Note that it is critical to distinguish between reasoning via backward chaining from queries to known facts, and reasoning backwards from known consequents to unknown antecedents. To be specific, by reasoning backwards we mean that if the consequent of a rule is known to be true, we assume that the antecedent will be as well. For example, let's assume that we know that $Serves(Rudys, VegetarianFood)$ is true. Since this fact matches the consequent of our rule, we might reason backwards to the conclusion that $VegetarianRestaurant(Rudys)$.

ABDUCTION

While backward chaining is a sound method of reasoning, reasoning backwards is an invalid, though frequently useful, form of *plausible reasoning*. Plausible reasoning from consequents to antecedents is known as **abduction**, and as we will see in Ch. 21 is often useful in accounting for many of the inferences people make while analyzing extended discourses.

COMPLETE

While forward and backward reasoning are sound, neither is **complete**. This means that there are valid inferences that can not be found by systems using these methods alone. Fortunately, there is an alternative inference technique called **resolution** that is sound and complete. Unfortunately, inference systems based on resolution are far more computationally expensive than forward or backward chaining systems. In practice, therefore, most systems use some form of chaining, and place a burden on knowledge base developers to encode the knowledge in a fashion that permits the necessary inferences to be drawn.

RESOLUTION

17.5 SOME LINGUISTICALLY RELEVANT CONCEPTS

Entire lives have been spent studying the representation of various aspects of human knowledge. These efforts have ranged from tightly focused efforts to represent individual domains such as time, to monumental efforts to encode all of our commonsense knowledge of the world (Lenat and Guha, 1991). Our focus here is considerably more modest. This section provides a brief overview of the representation of a few important topics that have clear implications for language processing. Specifically, the following sections provide introductions to the meaning representations of categories, events, time, and beliefs.

17.5.1 Categories

As we noted in Section 17.2, words with predicate-like semantics often express preferences for the semantics of their arguments in the form of selectional restrictions. These restrictions are typically expressed in the form of semantically-based categories where all the members of a category share a set of relevant features.

The most common way to represent categories is to create a unary predicate for each category of interest. Such predicates can then be asserted for each member of that category. For example, in our restaurant discussions we have been using the unary predicate *VegetarianRestaurant* as in:

VegetarianRestaurant(Maharani)

Similar logical formulas would be included in our knowledge base for each known vegetarian restaurant.

Unfortunately, in this method categories are relations, rather than full-fledged objects. It is, therefore, difficult to make assertions about categories themselves, rather than about their individual members. For example, we might want to designate the most popular member of a given category as in the following expression:

MostPopular(Maharani, VegetarianRestaurant)

Unfortunately, this is not a legal FOPC formula since the arguments to predicates in FOPC must be *Terms*, not other predicates.

REIFICATION

One way to solve this problem is to represent all the concepts that we want to make statements about as full-fledged objects via a technique called **reification**. In this case, we can represent the category of *VegetarianRestaurant* as an object just as *Maharani* is. The notion of membership in such a category is then denoted via a membership relation as in the following:

ISA(Maharani, VegetarianRestaurant)

The relation denoted by *ISA* (is a) holds between objects and the categories in which they are members. This technique can be extended to create hierarchies of categories through the use of other similar relations, as in the following:

AKO(VegetarianRestaurant, Restaurant)

Here, the relation *AKO* (a kind of) holds between categories and denotes a category inclusion relationship. Of course, to truly give these predicates meaning they would have to be situated in a larger set of facts defining categories as sets.

Ch. 19 discusses the practical use of such relations in databases of lexical relations, in the representation of selectional restrictions, and in word sense disambiguation.

17.5.2 Events

The representations for events that we have used until now have consisted of single predicates with as many arguments as are needed to incorporate all the roles associated with a given example. For example, the representation for *making a reservation* discussed in Section 17.2 consisted of a single predicate with arguments for the person making the reservation, the restaurant, the day, the time, and the number of people in the party, as in the following:

Reservation(Hearer, Maharani, Today, 8PM, 2)

In the case of verbs, this approach simply assumes that the predicate representing the meaning of a verb has the same number of arguments as are present in the verb's syntactic subcategorization frame.

Unfortunately, there are four problems with this approach that make it awkward to apply in practice:

- Determining the correct number of roles for any given event.
- Representing facts about the roles associated with an event.
- Ensuring that all the correct inferences can be derived directly from the representation of an event.
- Ensuring that no incorrect inferences can be derived from the representation of an event.

We will explore these, and other related issues, by considering a series of representations for events. This discussion will focus on the following examples of the verb *eat*:

- (17.26) I ate.
- (17.27) I ate a turkey sandwich.
- (17.28) I ate a turkey sandwich at my desk.
- (17.29) I ate at my desk.
- (17.30) I ate lunch.
- (17.31) I ate a turkey sandwich for lunch.
- (17.32) I ate a turkey sandwich for lunch at my desk.

Clearly, the variable number of arguments for a predicate-bearing verb like *eat* poses a tricky problem. While we would like to think that all of these examples denote the same kind of event, predicates in FOPC have fixed **arity**—they take a fixed number of arguments.

ARITY

One possible solution is suggested by the way that examples like these are handled syntactically. The solution given in Ch. 16 was to create one subcategorization frame for each of the configurations of arguments that a verb allows. The

semantic analog to this approach is to create as many different *eating* predicates as are needed to handle all of the ways that *eat* behaves. Such an approach would yield the following kinds of representations for examples (17.26) through (17.26).

*Eating*₁(*Speaker*)
*Eating*₂(*Speaker*, *TurkeySandwich*)
*Eating*₃(*Speaker*, *TurkeySandwich*, *Desk*)
*Eating*₄(*Speaker*, *Desk*)
*Eating*₅(*Speaker*, *Lunch*)
*Eating*₆(*Speaker*, *TurkeySandwich*, *Lunch*)
*Eating*₇(*Speaker*, *TurkeySandwich*, *Lunch*, *Desk*)

This approach simply sidesteps the issue of how many arguments the *Eating* predicate should have by creating distinct predicates for each of the subcategorization frames. Unfortunately, this approach comes at a rather high cost. Other than the suggestive names of the predicates, there is nothing to tie these events to one another even though there are obvious logical relations among them. Specifically, if example (17.32) is true then all of the other examples are true as well. Similarly, if example (17.31) is true then examples (17.26), (17.27), and (17.30) must also be true. Such logical connections can not be made on the basis of these predicates alone. Moreover, we would expect a commonsense knowledge base to contain logical connections between concepts like *Eating* and related concepts like *Hunger* and *Food*.

MEANING
POSTULATES

One method to solve these problems involves the use of what are called **meaning postulates**. Consider the following example postulate:

$$\forall w, x, y, z \text{ } Eating_7(w, x, y, z) \Rightarrow Eating_6(w, x, y)$$

This postulate explicitly ties together the semantics of two of our predicates. Other postulates could be created to handle the rest of the logical relations among the various *Eatings* and the connections from them to other related concepts.

Although such an approach might be made to work in small domains, it clearly has scalability problems. A somewhat more sensible approach is to say that examples (17.26) through (17.32) all reference the same predicate with some of the arguments missing from some of the surface forms. Under this approach, as many arguments are included in the definition of the predicate as ever appear with it in an input. Adopting the structure of a predicate like *Eating*₇ as an example would give us a predicate with four arguments denoting the eater, thing eaten, meal being eaten and the location of the eating. The following formulas would then

capture the semantics of our examples:

$$\begin{aligned} &\exists w, x, y \text{ Eating}(\text{Speaker}, w, x, y) \\ &\exists w, x \text{ Eating}(\text{Speaker}, \text{TurkeySandwich}, w, x) \\ &\exists w \text{ Eating}(\text{Speaker}, \text{TurkeySandwich}, w, \text{Desk}) \\ &\exists w, x \text{ Eating}(\text{Speaker}, w, x, \text{Desk}) \\ &\exists w, x \text{ Eating}(\text{Speaker}, w, \text{Lunch}, x) \\ &\exists w \text{ Eating}(\text{Speaker}, \text{TurkeySandwich}, \text{Lunch}, w) \\ &\text{Eating}(\text{Speaker}, \text{TurkeySandwich}, \text{Lunch}, \text{Desk}) \end{aligned}$$

This approach directly yields the obvious logical connections among these formulas without the use of meaning postulates. Specifically, all of the sentences with ground terms as arguments logically imply the truth of the formulas with existentially bound variables as arguments.

Unfortunately, this approach still has at least two glaring deficiencies: it makes too many commitments, and it does not let us individuate events. As an example of how it makes too many commitments, consider how we accommodated the *for lunch* complement in examples (17.30) through (17.32); a third argument, the meal being eaten, was added to the *Eating* predicate. The presence of this argument implicitly makes it the case that all eating events are associated with a meal (i.e., breakfast, lunch, or dinner). More specifically, the existentially quantified variable for the meal argument in the above examples states that there is some formal meal associated with each of these eatings. This is clearly silly since one can certainly eat something independent of it being associated with a meal.

To see how this approach fails to properly individuate events, consider the following formulas.

$$\begin{aligned} &\exists w, x \text{ Eating}(\text{Speaker}, w, x, \text{Desk}) \\ &\exists w, x \text{ Eating}(\text{Speaker}, w, \text{Lunch}, x) \\ &\exists w, x \text{ Eating}(\text{Speaker}, w, \text{Lunch}, \text{Desk}) \end{aligned}$$

If we knew that the first two formulas were referring to the same event, they could be combined to create the third representation. Unfortunately, with the current representation we have no way of telling if this is possible. The independent facts that *I ate at my desk* and *I ate lunch* do not permit us to conclude that *I ate lunch at my desk*. Clearly what is lacking is some way of referring to the events in question.

As with categories, we can solve these problems if we employ reification to elevate events to objects that can be quantified and related to other objects via sets of defined relations (Davidson, 1967; Parsons, 1990). Consider the representation of example (17.27) under this kind of approach.

$$\begin{aligned} &\exists w \text{ ISA}(w, \text{Eating}) \\ &\quad \wedge \text{Eater}(w, \text{Speaker}) \wedge \text{Eaten}(w, \text{TurkeySandwich}) \end{aligned}$$

This representation states that there is an eating event where the *Speaker* is doing the eating and a *TurkeySandwich* is being eaten. The meaning representations for examples (17.26) and (17.31) can be constructed similarly.

$$\begin{aligned} & \exists w \text{ISA}(w, \text{Eating}) \wedge \text{Eater}(w, \text{Speaker}) \\ & \exists w \text{ISA}(w, \text{Eating}) \\ & \quad \wedge \text{Eater}(w, \text{Speaker}) \wedge \text{Eaten}(w, \text{TurkeySandwich}) \\ & \quad \wedge \text{MealEaten}(w, \text{Lunch}) \end{aligned}$$

Under this reified-event approach:

- There is no need to specify a fixed number of arguments for a given surface predicate; rather as many roles and fillers can be glued on as appear in the input.
- No more roles are postulated than are mentioned in the input.
- The logical connections among closely related examples are satisfied without the need for meaning postulates.

17.5.3 Representing Time

In the preceding discussion of events, we did not address the issue of representing the time when the represented events are supposed to have occurred. The representation of such information in a useful form is the domain of **temporal logic**. This discussion will serve to introduce the most basic concerns of temporal logic along with a brief discussion of the means by which human languages convey temporal information, which among other things includes **tense logic**, the ways that verb tenses convey temporal information.

TEMPORAL LOGIC

TENSE LOGIC

The most straightforward theory of time hold that it flows inexorably forward, and that events are associated with either points or intervals in time, as on a timeline. Given these notions, an ordering can be imposed on distinct events by situating them on the timeline. More specifically, we can say that one event *precedes* another, if the flow of time leads from the first event to the second. Accompanying these notions in most theories is the idea of the current moment in time. Combining this notion with the idea of a temporal ordering relationship yields the familiar notions of past, present and future.

Not surprisingly, there are a large number of schemes for representing this kind of temporal information. The one presented here is a fairly simple one that stays within the FOPC framework of reified events that we have been pursuing. Consider the following examples:

(17.33) I arrived in New York.

(17.34) I am arriving in New York.

(17.35) I will arrive in New York.

These sentences all refer to the same kind of event and differ solely in the tense of the verb. In our current scheme for representing events, all three would share the following kind of representation, which lacks any temporal information:

$$\exists w \text{ ISA}(w, \text{Arriving}) \\ \wedge \text{Arriver}(w, \text{Speaker}) \wedge \text{Destination}(w, \text{NewYork})$$

The temporal information provided by the tense of the verbs can be exploited by predicating additional information about the event variable w . Specifically, we can add temporal variables representing the interval corresponding to the event, the end point of the event, and temporal predicates relating this end point to the current time as indicated by the tense of the verb. Such an approach yields the following representations for our *arriving* examples:

$$\exists i, e, w, t \text{ ISA}(w, \text{Arriving}) \\ \wedge \text{Arriver}(w, \text{Speaker}) \wedge \text{Destination}(w, \text{NewYork}) \\ \text{IntervalOf}(w, i) \wedge \text{EndPoint}(i, e) \wedge \text{Precedes}(e, \text{Now})$$

$$\exists i, e, w, t \text{ ISA}(w, \text{Arriving}) \\ \wedge \text{Arriver}(w, \text{Speaker}) \wedge \text{Destination}(w, \text{NewYork}) \\ \text{IntervalOf}(w, i) \wedge \text{MemberOf}(i, \text{Now})$$

$$\exists i, e, w, t \text{ ISA}(w, \text{Arriving}) \\ \wedge \text{Arriver}(w, \text{Speaker}) \wedge \text{Destination}(w, \text{NewYork}) \\ \text{IntervalOf}(w, i) \wedge \text{EndPoint}(i, e) \wedge \text{Precedes}(\text{Now}, e)$$

This representation introduces a variable to stand for the interval of time associated with the event, and a variable that stands for the end of that interval. The two-place predicate *Precedes* represents the notion that the first time point argument precedes the second in time; the constant *Now* refers to the current time. For past events, the end point of the interval must precede the current time. Similarly, for future events the current time must precede the end of the event. For events happening in the present, the current time is contained within the event interval.

Unfortunately, the relation between simple verb tenses and points in time is by no means straightforward. Consider the following examples:

(17.36) Ok, we fly from San Francisco to Boston at 10.

(17.37) Flight 1390 will be at the gate an hour now.

In the first example, the present tense of the verb *fly* is used to refer to a future event, while in the second the future tense is used to refer to a past event.

More complications occur when we consider some of the other verb tenses. Consider the following examples:

(17.38) Flight 1902 arrived late.

(17.39) Flight 1902 had arrived late.

Although both refer to events in the past, representing them in the same way seems wrong. The second example seems to have another unnamed event lurking in the background (e.g., Flight 1902 had already arrived late *when* something else happened). To account for this phenomena, Reichenbach (1947) introduced the notion of a **reference point**. In our simple temporal scheme, the current moment in time is equated with the time of the utterance, and is used as a reference point for when the event occurred (before, at, or after). In Reichenbach's approach, the notion of the reference point is separated out from the utterance time and the event time. The following examples illustrate the basics of this approach:

REFERENCE POINT

(17.40) When Mary's flight departed, I ate lunch.

(17.41) When Mary's flight departed, I had eaten lunch.

In both of these examples, the eating event has happened in the past, i.e. prior to the utterance. However, the verb tense in the first example indicates that the eating event began when the flight departed, while the second example indicates that the eating was accomplished prior to the flight's departure. Therefore, in Reichenbach's terms the *departure* event specifies the reference point. These facts can be accommodated by asserting additional constraints relating the *eating* and *departure* events. In the first example, the reference point precedes the *eating* event, and in the second example, the eating precedes the reference point. Figure 17.5 illustrates Reichenbach's approach with the primary English tenses. Exercise 17.9 asks you to represent these examples in FOPC.




Figure 17.5 Reichenbach's approach applied to various English tenses. In these diagrams, time flows from left to right, an **E** denotes the time of the event, an **R** denotes the reference time, and an **U** denotes the time of the utterance.

This discussion has focused narrowly on the broad notions of past, present, and future and how they are signaled by verb tenses. Of course, languages also have

many other more direct and more specific ways to convey temporal information, including the use of a wide variety of temporal expressions as in the following ATIS examples:

- (17.42) I'd like to go at 6:45, in the morning.
- (17.43) Somewhere around noon, please.
- (17.44) Later in the afternoon, near 6PM.

As we will see in the next chapter, grammars for such temporal expressions are of considerable practical importance in information extraction and question-answering applications.

Finally, we should note that there is a systematic conceptual organization reflected in examples like these. In particular, temporal expressions in English are frequently expressed in spatial terms, as is illustrated by the various uses of *at*, *in*, *somewhere* and *near* in these examples (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Jackendoff, 1983) Metaphorical organizations such as these, where one domain is systematically expressed in terms of another, will be discussed in more detail in Ch. 19.

17.5.4 Aspect

ASPECT

In the last section, we discussed ways to represent the time of an event with respect to the time of an utterance describing it. In this section, we address the notion of **aspect**, which concerns a cluster of related topics, including whether an event has ended or is ongoing, whether it is conceptualized as happening at a point in time or over some interval, and whether or not any particular state in the world comes about because of it. Based on these and related notions, event expressions have traditionally been divided into four general classes: **statives**, **activities**, **accomplishments**, and **achievements**. The following examples provide prototypical instances of each class.

- Stative:** I know my departure gate.
- Activity:** John is flying.
- Accomplishment:** Sally booked her flight.
- Achievement:** She found her gate.

Although the earliest versions of this classification were discussed by Aristotle, the one presented here is due to Vendler (1967). In the following discussion, we'll present a brief characterization of each of the four classes, along with some diagnostic techniques suggested in Dowty (1979) for identifying examples of each kind.

STATIVE
EXPRESSIONS

Stative expressions represent the notion of an event participant having a particular property, or being in a state, at a given point in time. As such, they can be

thought of as capturing an aspect of a world at a single point in time. Consider the following ATIS examples.

- (17.45) I like Flight 840 arriving at 10:06.
- (17.46) I need the cheapest fare.
- (17.47) I have a round trip ticket for \$662.
- (17.48) I want to go first class.

In examples like these, the event participant denoted by the subject can be seen as experiencing something at a specific point in time. Whether or not the experiencer was in the same state earlier, or will be in the future is left unspecified.

There are a number of diagnostic tests for identifying statives. As an example, stative verbs are distinctly odd when used in the progressive form.

- (17.49) *I am needing the cheapest fare on this day.
- (17.50) *I am wanting to go first class.

We should note that in these and subsequent examples, we are using an * to indicate a broadened notion of ill-formedness that may include both semantic and syntactic factors.

Statives are also odd when used as imperatives.

- (17.51) *Need the cheapest fare!

Finally, statives are not easily modified by adverbs like *deliberately* and *carefully*.

- (17.52) *I deliberately like Flight 840 arriving at 10:06.
- (17.53) *I carefully like Flight 840 arriving at 10:06.

ACTIVITY EXPRESSIONS

Activity expressions describe events undertaken by a participant that have no particular end point. Unlike statives, activities are seen as occurring over some span of time, and are therefore not associated with single points in time. Consider the following examples:

- (17.54) She drove a Mazda.
- (17.55) I live in Brooklyn.

These examples both specify that the subject is engaged in, or has engaged in, the activity specified by the verb for some period of time.

Unlike statives, activity expressions are fine in both the progressive and imperative forms.

- (17.56) She is living in Brooklyn.
- (17.57) Drive a Mazda!

However, like statives, activity expressions are odd when temporally modified with temporal expressions using *in*.

(17.58) *I live in Brooklyn in a month.

(17.59) *She drove a Mazda in an hour.

They can, however, successfully be used with *for* temporal adverbials, as in the following examples:

(17.60) I live in Brooklyn for a month.

(17.61) She drove a Mazda for an hour.

ACCOMPLISHMENT
EXPRESSIONS

Unlike activities, **accomplishment expressions** describe events that have a natural end point and result in a particular state. Consider the following examples:

(17.62) He booked me a reservation.

(17.63) United flew me to New York.

In these examples, there is an event that is seen as occurring over some period of time that ends when the intended state is accomplished.

A number of diagnostics can be used to distinguish accomplishment events from activities. Consider the following examples, which make use of the word *stop* as a test.

(17.64) I stopped living in Brooklyn.

(17.65) She stopped booking my flight.

In the first example, which is an activity, one can safely conclude that the statement *I lived in Brooklyn* even though this activity came to an end. However, from the second example, one can not conclude the statement *She booked her flight*, since the activity was stopped before the intended state was accomplished. Therefore, although stopping an activity entails that the activity took place, stopping an accomplishment event indicates that the event did not succeed.

Activities and accomplishments can also be distinguished by how they can be modified by various temporal adverbials. Consider the following examples:

(17.66) *I lived in Brooklyn in a year.

(17.67) She booked a flight in a minute.

In general, accomplishments can be modified by *in* temporal expressions, while simple activities can not.

ACHIEVEMENT
EXPRESSIONS

The final aspectual class, **achievement expressions**, are similar to accomplishments in that they result in a state. Consider the following examples:

(17.68) She found her gate.

(17.69) I reached New York.

Unlike accomplishments, achievement events are thought of as happening in an instant, and are not equated with any particular activity leading up to the state. To

be more specific, the events in these examples may have been preceded by extended *searching* or *traveling* events, but the events corresponding directly to *found* and *reach* are conceived of as points not intervals.

The point-like nature of these events has implications for how they can be temporally modified. In particular, consider the following examples:

- (17.70) I lived in New York for a year.
 (17.71) *I reached New York for a few minutes.

Unlike activity and accomplishment expressions, achievements can not be modified by *for* adverbials.

Achievements can also be distinguished from accomplishments by employing the word *stop*, as we did earlier. Consider the following examples:

- (17.72) I stopped booking my flight.
 (17.73) *I stopped reaching New York.

As we saw earlier, using *stop* with an accomplishment expression results in a failure to reach the intended state. Note, however, that the resulting expression is perfectly well-formed. On the other hand, using *stop* with an achievement example is unacceptable.

We should note that since both accomplishments and achievements are events that result in a state, they are sometimes characterized as sub-types of a single aspectual class. Members of this combined class are known as **telic eventualities**.

TELEVENTUALITIES

Before moving on, we should make two points about this classification scheme. The first point is that event expressions can easily be shifted from one class to another. Consider the following examples:

- (17.74) I flew.
 (17.75) I flew to New York.

The first example is a simple activity; it has no natural end point and can not be temporally modified by *in* temporal expressions. On the other hand, the second example is clearly an accomplishment event since it has an end point, results in a particular state, and can be temporally modified in all the ways that accomplishments can. Clearly the classification of an event is not solely governed by the verb, but by the semantics of the entire expression in context.

The second point is that while classifications such as this one are often useful, they do not *explain* why it is that events expressed in natural languages fall into these particular classes. We will revisit this issue in Ch. 19 where we will sketch a representational approach due to Dowty (1979) that accounts for these classes.

17.5.5 Representing Beliefs

There are a fair number of words and expressions that have what might be called a *world creating* ability. By this, we mean that their meaning representations contain logical formulas that are not intended to be taken as true in the real world, but rather as part of some kind of hypothetical world. In addition, these meaning representations often denote a relation from the speaker, or some other entity, to this hypothetical world. Examples of words that have this ability are *believe*, *want*, *imagine* and *know*. World-creating words generally take various sentence-like constituents as arguments.

Consider the following example:

(17.76) I believe that Mary ate British food.

Applying our event-oriented approach we would say that there are two events underlying this sentence: a believing event relating the speaker to some specific belief, and an eating event that plays the role of the believed thing. Ignoring temporal information, a straightforward application of our reified event approach would produce the following kind of representation:

$$\begin{aligned} \exists u, v \text{ ISA}(u, \text{Believing}) \wedge \text{ISA}(v, \text{Eating}) \\ \wedge \text{Believer}(u, \text{Speaker}) \wedge \text{BelievedProp}(u, v) \\ \wedge \text{Eater}(v, \text{Mary}) \wedge \text{Eaten}(v, \text{BritishFood}) \end{aligned}$$

This seems relatively straightforward, all the right roles are present and the two events are tied together in a reasonable way. Recall, however, that in conjunctive representations like this all of the individual conjuncts must be taken to be true. In this case, this results in a statement that there actually was an eating of British food by Mary. Specifically, by breaking this formula apart into separate formulas by conjunction elimination, the following formula can be produced:

$$\begin{aligned} \exists v \text{ ISA}(v, \text{Eating}) \\ \wedge \text{Eater}(v, \text{Mary}) \wedge \text{Eaten}(v, \text{BritishFood}) \end{aligned}$$

This is clearly more than we want to say. The fact that the speaker believes this proposition does not make it true; it is only true in the world represented by the speaker's beliefs. What is needed is a representation that has a structure similar to this, but where the *Eating* event is given a special status.

Note that reverting to the simpler predicate representations we used earlier in this chapter does not help. A common mistake using such representations would be to represent this sentence with the following kind of formula:

$$\text{Believing}(\text{Speaker}, \text{Eating}(\text{Mary}, \text{BritishFood}))$$

The problem with this representation is that it is not even valid FOPC. The second argument to the *Believing* predicate should be a FOPC term, not a formula.

This syntactic error reflects a deeper semantic problem. Predicates in FOPC hold between the objects in the domain being modeled, not between the relations that hold among the objects in the domain. Therefore, FOPC lacks a meaningful way to assert relations about full propositions, which is unfortunately exactly what words like *believe*, *want*, *imagine* and *know* want to do.

The standard method for handling this situation is to augment FOPC with *operators* that allow us to make statements about full logical formulas. Let's consider how this approach might work in the case of example (17.76). We can introduce an operator called *Believes* that takes two FOPC formulas as its arguments: a formula designating a believer, and a formula designating the believed proposition. Applying this operator would result in the following meaning representation:

$$\text{Believes}(\text{Speaker}, \exists v \text{ISA}(v, \text{Eating}) \\ \wedge \text{Eater}(v, \text{Mary}) \wedge \text{Eaten}(v, \text{BritishFood}))$$

Under this approach, the contribution of the word *believes* to this meaning representation is not a FOPC proposition at all, but rather an operator that is applied to the believed proposition. Therefore, as we discuss in Ch. 18, these world creating verbs play quite a different role in the semantic analysis than more ordinary verbs like *eat*.

As one might expect, keeping track of who believes what about whom at any given point in time gets rather complex. As we will see in Ch. 21, this is an important task in interactive systems that must track users' beliefs as they change during the course of a dialogue.

Operators like *Believes* that apply to logical formulas are known as **modal operators**. Correspondingly, a logic augmented with such operators is known as a **modal logic**. Modal logics have found many uses in the representation of common-sense knowledge in addition to the modeling of belief, among the more prominent are representations of time and hypothetical worlds.

Not surprisingly, modal operators and modal logics raise a host of complex theoretical and practical problems that we cannot even begin to do justice to here. Among the more important issues are the following:

- How inference works in the presence of specific modal operators.
- The kinds of logical formula that particular operators can be applied to.
- How modal operators interact with quantifiers and logical connectives.
- The influence of these operators on the equality of terms across formulas.

The last issue in this list has consequences for modeling agent's knowledge and beliefs in dialogue systems and deserves some elaboration here. In standard FOPC systems, logical terms that are known to be equal to one another can be freely substituted without having any effect on the truth of sentences they occur in. Consider the following examples:

(17.77) Snow has delayed Flight 1045.

(17.78) John's sister's flight serves dinner.

Assuming that these two flights are the same, substituting *Flight 1045* for *John's sister's flight* has no effect on the truth of either sentence.

Now consider, the following variation on the first example:

(17.79) John knows that snow has delayed Flight 1045.

(17.80) John knows that his sister's flight serves dinner.

Here the substitution does not work. John may well know that Flight 1045 has been delayed without knowing that his sister's flight is delayed, simply because he may not know the number of his sister's flight. In other words, even if we assume that these sentences are true, and that John's sister is on Flight 1045, we can not say anything about the truth of the following sentence:

(17.81) John knows that snow has delayed his sister's flight.

Settings like this where a modal operator like *Know* is involved are called **referentially opaque**. In referentially opaque settings, substitution of equal terms may or may not succeed. Ordinary settings where such substitutions always work are said to be **referentially transparent**.

REFERENTIALLY
OPAQUE

REFERENTIALLY
TRANSPARENT

17.5.6 Pitfalls

As noted in Section 17.4, there are a number of common mistakes in representing the meaning of natural language utterances, that arise from confusing, or equating, elements from real languages with elements in FOPC. Consider the following example, which on the surface looks like a candidate for a standard implication rule:

(17.82) If you're interested in baseball, the Rockies are playing tonight.

A straightforward translation of this sentence into FOPC might look something like this:

$$\begin{aligned} & \textit{HaveInterestIn}(\textit{Hearer}, \textit{Baseball}) \\ & \Rightarrow \textit{Playing}(\textit{Rockies}, \textit{Tonight}) \end{aligned}$$

This representation is flawed for a large number of reasons. The most obvious ones arise from the semantics of FOPC implications. In the event that the hearer is not interested in baseball, this formula becomes meaningless. Specifically, we can not draw any conclusion about the consequent clause when the antecedent is false. But of course this is a ridiculous conclusion, we know that the Rockies game will go forward regardless of whether or not the hearer happens to like baseball. Exercise 17.10 asks you to come up with a more reasonable FOPC translation of this example.

Now consider the following example:

(17.83) One more beer and I'll fall off this stool.

Again, a simple-minded translation of this sentence might consist of a conjunction of two clauses: one representing a drinking event and one representing a falling event. In this case, the surface use of the word *and* obscures the fact that this sentence instead has an implication underlying it. The lesson of both of these examples is that English words like *and*, *or* and *if* are only tenuously related to the elements of FOPC with the same names.

Along the same lines, it is important to remember the complete lack of significance of the names we make use of in representing FOPC formulas. Consider the following constant:

InexpensiveVegetarianIndianFoodOnTuesdays

Despite its impressive morphology, this term, by itself, has no more meaning than a constant like *X99* would have. See McDermott (1976) for a discourse on the inherent dangers of such naming schemes.

As we noted at the beginning of this chapter,

Basics and current applications/versions OWL as a kind of description logic as applied to the Semantic Web. See the Brachman thing.

basically we're going to arrange the concepts in a domain into a hierarchy. Then we're going to relate the elements in the hierarchy via type slot-filler relations (value/resritictions). Then there's inheritance.

unary and binary predicates only? I.e. what you get in a network.


17.6 RELATED REPRESENTATIONAL APPROACHES

Over the years, a fair number of representational schemes have been invented to capture the meaning of linguistic utterances for use in natural language processing systems. Other than First Order Logic, the most widely used schemes have been **semantic networks** and **frames**, which are also known as **slot-filler** representations. The KL-ONE (Brachman and Schmolze, 1985), and KRL (Bobrow and Winograd, 1977) systems were influential efforts to represent knowledge for use in natural language processing systems.

In semantic networks, objects are represented as nodes in a graph, with relations between objects being represented by named links. In frame-based systems, objects are represented as feature-structures similar to those discussed in Ch. 16, which can, of course, also be naturally represented as graphs. In this approach features are called slots and the values, or fillers, of these slots can either be atomic

values or other embedded frames. The following diagram illustrates how example (17.76) might be captured in a frame-based approach.

I believe Mary ate British food.



It is now widely accepted that meanings represented in these approaches can in principle be translated into equivalent statements in FOL with relative ease. The difficulty is that in many of these approaches the semantics of a statement is defined procedurally. That is, the meaning arises from whatever the system that interprets it does with it.

17.6.1 Description Logics

Description Logics can be viewed as an effort to better understand and specify the semantics of these earlier **structured network representations**, and to provide a conceptual framework that is especially well-suited to certain kinds of domain modeling. Formally, the term Description Logics refers to a family of logical approaches that correspond to varying subsets of FOL. The various restrictions placed on the expressiveness of Description Logics serve to guarantee the tractability of various critical kinds of inference. Our focus here, however, will be on the modeling aspects of DLs rather than computational complexity issues.

When using Description Logics to model an application domain, the emphasis is on the representation of knowledge about categories, individuals that belong to those categories, and the relationships that can hold among these individuals. The set of categories, or concepts, that make up the particular application domain is called its **Terminology**. The portion of a knowledge-base that contains the terminology is traditionally called the **TBox**; this is in contrast to the **ABox** that contains facts about individuals. The terminology is typically arranged into a hierarchical organization called an **Ontology** that captures the subset/superset relations among the categories.

To illustrate this approach, let's return to our earlier culinary domain, which included notions like restaurants, cuisines, and patrons, among others. We represented concepts like these in FOL by using unary predicates such as *Restaurant(x)*; the DL equivalent simply omits the variable, so the category corresponding to the

TERMINOLOGY

TBOX

ABOX

ONTOLOGY

notion of a restaurant is simply written as `Restaurant`.² To capture the notion that a particular domain element, such as *Frasca*, is a restaurant we simply assert `Restaurant(Frasca)` in much the same way we would in FOL. The semantics of these categories is specified in precisely the same way that was introduced earlier in Sec. 17.3: a category like `Restaurant` simply denotes the set of domain elements that are restaurants.

Having specified the categories of interest in a state of affairs, the next step is to arrange these categories into a hierarchical structure. There are two ways to capture the hierarchical relationships present in a terminology: we can directly assert relations between categories that are related hierarchically, or we can provide complete definitions for our concepts and then rely on these definitions to infer hierarchical relationships. The choice between these methods hinges on the use to which the resulting categories will be put and the feasibility of formulating precise definitions for many naturally occurring categories. We'll discuss the first option here, and the return to the notion of definitions later in this section.

SUBSUMPTION

To directly specify a hierarchical structure, we can assert **subsumption** relations between the appropriate concepts in a terminology. The subsumption relation is conventionally written as $C \sqsubseteq D$, and is read as *C* is subsumed by *D*; that is, all members of the category *C* are also members of the category *D*. Not surprisingly, the formal semantics of this relation is provided by a simple set relation; any domain element that is in the set denoted by *C* is also in the set denoted by *D*.


Continuing with our restaurant theme, adding the following statements to the TBox asserts that all restaurants are commercial establishments, and moreover that there are various sub-types of restaurants.

```
Restaurant  $\sqsubseteq$  CommercialEstablishment
ItalianRestaurant  $\sqsubseteq$  Restaurant
ChineseRestaurant  $\sqsubseteq$  Restaurant
MexicanRestaurant  $\sqsubseteq$  Restaurant
```

Ontologies such as this are conventionally illustrated using diagrams such as the one shown in Fig. 17.6 where subsumption relations are denoted by links between the nodes representing the categories.

Note however that it was precisely the vague nature of network diagrams like this that motivated the development of Description Logics. For example, from this diagram we can't tell whether or not the given set of categories is exhaustive or disjoint. That is, we can't tell if these are all the kinds of restaurants that we'll be dealing with in our domain, or whether there might be others. We also can't

² DL statements are conventionally typeset with a sans serif font. We'll follow that convention here, reverting back to our standard mathematical notation when giving FOL equivalents of DL statements.



tell if an individual restaurant must fall into only *one* of these categories, or if it is possible, for example, for a restaurant to be *both* Italian and Chinese. The DL statements given above are more transparent in their meaning; they simply assert a set of subsumption relations between categories and make no claims about coverage or mutual exclusion.

If an application requires coverage and disjointness information then it needs to be made explicitly. The simplest ways to capture this kind of information is through the use of negation and disjunction operators. For example, the following assertion would tell us that Chinese restaurants can't also be Italian restaurants.

ChineseRestaurant \sqsubseteq **not** ItalianRestaurant

Specifying that a set of sub-concepts covers a category can be achieved with with disjunction, as in the following:

Restaurant \sqsubseteq (**or** ItalianRestaurant ChineseRestaurant MexicanRestaurant)

Of course, having a hierarchy such as the one given in Fig. 17.6 tells us next to nothing about the concepts in it. We certainly don't know anything about what makes a restaurant a restaurant, much less Italian, Chinese or expensive. What is needed are additional assertions about what it means to be a member of any of these categories. In Description Logics such statements come in the form of relations between the concepts being described and other concepts in the domain. In keeping with its origins in structured network representations, relations in Description Logics are typically binary and are often referred to as roles, or role-relations.

To see how such relations work, let's consider some of the facts about restaurants discussed earlier in the chapter. We'll use the `hasCuisine` relation to capture information as to what kinds of food restaurants serve, and the `hasPriceRange` relation to capture how pricey particular restaurants tend to be. We can use these relations to say something more concrete about our various classes of restaurants. Let's start with our `ItalianRestaurant` concept. As a first approximation, we might say something uncontroversial like Italian restaurants serve Italian cuisine. To capture these notions, let's first add some new concepts to our terminology to represent various kinds of cuisine.

MexicanCuisine \sqsubseteq Cuisine	ExpensiveRestaurant \sqsubseteq Restaurant
ItalianCuisine \sqsubseteq Cuisine	ModerateRestaurant \sqsubseteq Restaurant
ChineseCuisine \sqsubseteq Cuisine	CheapRestaurant \sqsubseteq Restaurant
VegetarianCuisine \sqsubseteq Cuisine	

Next let's revise our earlier version of `ItalianRestaurant` to capture cuisine information.

$$\text{ItalianRestaurant} \sqsubseteq \text{Restaurant} \sqcap \exists \text{hasCuisine. ItalianCuisine}$$

The way to read this expression is that individuals in the category `ItalianRestaurant` are subsumed both by the category `Restaurant`, and by an unnamed class defined by the existential clause — the set of entities that serve Italian cuisine. An equivalent statement in FOL would be:

$$\forall x \text{ItalianRestaurant}(x) \rightarrow \text{Restaurant}(x) \wedge (\exists y \text{Serves}(x, y) \wedge \text{ItalianCuisine}(y))$$

This FOL translation should make it clear what the DL assertions given above do, and do not entail. In particular, they don't say that domain entities classified as Italian restaurants can't engage in other relations like being expensive, or even serving Chinese cuisine. And critically, they don't say much about domain entities that we know do serve Italian cuisine. In fact, inspection of the FOL translation makes it clear that we can't *infer* that any new entities belong to this category based

on their characteristics. The best we can do is infer new facts about restaurants that we're explicitly told are members of this category

Of course, inferring the category membership of individuals given certain characteristics is a common and critical reasoning task that we need to support. This brings us back to the alternative approach to creating hierarchical structures in a terminology: actually providing a **definition** of the categories we're creating in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions for category membership. In this case, we might explicitly provide a definition for `ItalianRestaurant` as being those restaurants that serve Italian cuisine, and `ModerateRestaurant` as being those whose price range is moderate.

$$\text{ItalianRestaurant} \equiv \text{Restaurant} \sqcap \exists \text{hasCuisine. ItalianCuisine}$$

$$\text{ModerateRestaurant} \equiv \text{Restaurant} \sqcap \text{hasPriceRange. ModeratePrices}$$

While our earlier statements provided necessary conditions for membership in these categories, these statements provide both necessary and sufficient conditions.

Finally, let's now consider the superficially similar case of vegetarian restaurants. Clearly, vegetarian restaurants are those that serve vegetarian cuisine. But they don't merely serve vegetarian fare, that's all they serve. We can accommodate this kind of constraint by adding an additional restriction in the form of a universal quantifier to our earlier description of `VegetarianRestaurants`, as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{VegetarianRestaurant} \equiv \text{Restaurant} \\ & \sqcap \exists \text{hasCuisine. VegetarianCuisine} \\ & \sqcap \forall \text{hasCuisine. VegetarianCuisine} \end{aligned}$$

Inference

Paralleling the focus of Description Logics on categories, relations and individuals, is a processing focus on a restricted subset of logical inference. Rather than employ the full range of reasoning permitted by FOL, DL reasoning systems emphasize the closely coupled problems of subsumption and instance checking.

SUBSUMPTION

INSTANCE CHECKING

Subsumption, as a form of inference, is the task of determining whether a superset/subset relationship exists between two concepts based on the facts asserted in a terminology. Correspondingly, **instance checking** asks if an individual can be a member of a particular category given the facts we know about both the individual and the terminology. The inference mechanisms underlying subsumption and instance checking go beyond simply checking for explicitly stated subsumption relations in a terminology. They must explicitly reason using the relational information asserted about the terminology to infer appropriate subsumption and membership relations.

Returning to our restaurant domain, let's add a new kind of restaurant using the following statement:

OliveGarden \sqsubseteq ModerateRestaurant $\sqcap \exists$ hasCuisine.ItalianCuisine

Given this assertion, we might ask whether the OliveGarden chain of restaurants might be classified as an Italian restaurant, or a vegetarian restaurant. More precisely, we can pose the following questions to our reasoning system:

OliveGarden \sqsubseteq ItalianRestaurant

OliveGarden \sqsubseteq VegetarianRestaurant

The answer to the first question is positive since OliveGarden meets the criteria we specified for the category ItalianRestaurant: it's a Restaurant since we explicitly classified it as a ModerateRestaurant, which is a subtype of Restaurant, and it meets the has.Cuisine class restriction since we've asserted that directly.

The answer to the second question is negative. Recall, that our criteria for vegetarian restaurants contains two requirements: it has to serve vegetarian fare, and that's all it can serve. Our current definition for OliveGarden fails on both counts since we have not asserted any relations that state that OliveGarden serves vegetarian fare, and the relation we have asserted, hasCuisine.ItalianCuisine, contradicts the second criteria.

A related reasoning task, based on the basic subsumption inference, is to derive the **implied hierarchy** for a terminology given facts about the categories in the terminology. This task roughly corresponds to a repeated application of the subsumption operator to pairs of concepts in the terminology. Given our current collection of statements, the expanded hierarchy shown in Fig. 17.7 can be inferred. You should convince yourself that this diagram contains all and only the subsumption links that should be present given our current knowledge.

Note that whereas subsumption is all about concepts and categories, **instance checking** is the task of determining whether a particular individual can be classified as a member of a particular category. This process takes what is known about a given individual, in the form of relations and explicit categorical statements, and then compares that information against what is known about the current terminology. It then returns a list of *the most specific* categories to which the individual can belong.

As an example of a categorization problem consider an establishment that we're told is a restaurant and serves Italian cuisine.

Restaurant(Gondolier)

hasCuisine(Gondolier, ItalianCuisine)

Here, we're being told that the entity denoted by the term Gondolier is a restaurant and serves Italian food. Given this new information and the contents of our current




Figure 17.7 A graphical network representation of the complete set of subsumption relations in the restaurant domain given the current set of assertions in the TBox.

TBox, we might reasonably like to ask if this is an Italian restaurant, a vegetarian restaurant or if it has moderate prices.

Assuming the definitional statements given earlier, we can indeed categorize the Gondolier as an Italian restaurant. That is, the information we've been given about it meets the necessary and sufficient conditions required for membership in this category. And as with the OliveGarden category, this individual fails to match the stated criteria for the VegetarianRestaurant. Finally, the Gondolier might also turn out to be an moderately priced restaurant, but we can't tell at this point since we don't know anything about its prices. What this means is that given our current knowledge the answer to the query `ModerateRestaurant(Gondolier)` would be false since it lacks the required `hasPriceRange` relation.

The implementation of subsumption, instance checking, as well as other kinds of inferences needed for practical applications, varies depending on the expressivity of the Description Logic being used. However, for Description Logics of even modest power, the primary implementation techniques are based on satisfiability methods that in turn rely on the underlying model-based semantics introduced earlier in this chapter.

OWL and the Semantic Web

The highest-profile role for Description Logics has been as a part of the development of the Semantic Web. The Semantic Web is an effort to provide a way to

formally specific the semantics of the contents of... A key component of this effort involves the creation and deployment of ontologies for various application areas of interest.

WEB ONTOLOGY
LANGUAGE

The meaning representation language used to represent this knowledge is the **Web Ontology Language** (OWL). OWL embodies a Description Logic that corresponds roughly to the one we've been describing here. There are now widely available tools to facilitate the creation of and reasoning with OWL-based knowledge bases().

17.7 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO MEANING

The idea that the translation of linguistic inputs into a formal representation made up of discrete symbols adequately captures the notion of meaning is, not surprisingly, subject to a considerable amount of debate. The following section give brief, wholly inadequate, overviews of some of the major concerns in these debates.

17.7.1 Meaning as Action

MEANING AS ACTION

An approach that holds considerable appeal when we consider the semantics of imperative sentences is the notion of **meaning as action**. Under this view, utterances are viewed as actions, and the meanings of these utterances reside in **procedures** that are activated in the hearer as a result of hearing the utterance. This approach was followed in the creation of the historically important SHRDLU system, and is summed up well by its creator Terry Winograd (1972).

One of the basic viewpoints underlying the model is that all language use can be thought of as a way of activating procedures within the hearer. We can think of an utterance as a program—one that indirectly causes a set of operations to be carried out within the hearer's cognitive system.

X-SCHEMA

A more recent procedural model of semantics is the **executing schema** or **x-schema** model of Bailey et al. (1997), Narayanan (1997a, 1997b), and Chang et al. (1998). The intuition of this model is that various parts of the semantics of events, including the *aspectual* factors discussed on page 32, are based on schematized descriptions of sensory-motor processes like inception, iteration, enabling, completion, force, and effort. The model represents the aspectual semantics of events via a kind of probabilistic automaton called a **Petri net** (Murata, 1989). The nets used in the model have states like *ready*, *process*, *finish*, *suspend*, and *result*.

The meaning representation of an example like *Jack is walking to the store* activates the *process* state of the walking event. An accomplishment event like

Jack walked to the store activates the *result* state. An iterative activity like *Jack walked to the store every week* is simulated in the model by an iterative activation of the *process* and *result* nodes. This idea of using sensory-motor primitives as a foundation for semantic description is also based on the work of Regier (1996) on the role of visual primitives in a computational model of learning the semantics of spatial prepositions.

17.7.2 Embodiment as the Basis for Meaning

Coming soon...

17.8 SUMMARY

This chapter has introduced the representational approach to meaning. The following are some of the highlights of this chapter:

- A major approach to meaning in computational linguistics involves the creation of **formal meaning representations** that capture the meaning-related content of linguistic inputs. These representations are intended to bridge the gap from language to commonsense knowledge of the world.
- The frameworks that specify the syntax and semantics of these representations are called **meaning representation languages**. A wide variety of such languages are used in natural language processing and artificial intelligence.
- Such representations need to be able to support the practical computational requirements of semantic processing. Among these are the need to **determine the truth of propositions**, to support **unambiguous representations**, to represent **variables**, to support **inference**, and to be sufficiently **expressive**.
- Human languages have a wide variety of features that are used to convey meaning. Among the most important of these is the ability to convey a **predicate-argument structure**.
- **First Order Predicate Calculus** is a well-understood computationally tractable meaning representation language that offers much of what is needed in a meaning representation language.
- Important classes of meaning including **categories**, **events**, and **time** can be captured in FOPC. Propositions corresponding to such concepts as **beliefs** and **desires** require extensions to FOPC including **modal operators**.
- **Semantic networks** and **frames** can be captured within the FOPC framework.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL NOTES

NB. Not yet updated.

The earliest computational use of declarative meaning representations in natural language processing was in the context of question-answering systems (Green et al., 1961; Raphael, 1968; Lindsey, 1963). These systems employed ad-hoc representations for the facts needed to answer questions. Questions were then translated into a form that could be matched against facts in the knowledge base. Simmons (1965) provides an overview of these early efforts.

Woods (1967) investigated the use of FOPC-like representations in question answering as a replacement for the ad-hoc representations in use at the time. Woods (1973) further developed and extended these ideas in the landmark Lunar system. Interestingly, the representations used in Lunar had both a truth-conditional and a procedural semantics. Winograd (1972) employed a similar representation based on the Micro-Planner language in his SHRDLU system.

During this same period, researchers interested in the cognitive modeling of language and memory had been working with various forms of associative network representations. Masterman (1957) was probably the first to make computational use of a semantic network-like knowledge representation, although semantic networks are generally credited to Quillian (1968). A considerable amount of work in the semantic network framework was carried out during this era (Norman and Rumelhart, 1975; Schank, 1972; Wilks, 1975b, 1975a; Kintsch, 1974). It was during this period that a number of researchers began to incorporate Fillmore's notion of case roles (Fillmore, 1968) into their representations. Simmons (1973) was the earliest adopter of case roles as part of representations for natural language processing.

Detailed analyses by Woods (1975) and Brachman (1979) aimed at figuring out what semantic networks actually mean led to the development of a number of more sophisticated network-like languages including KRL (Bobrow and Winograd, 1977) and KL-ONE (Brachman and Schmolze, 1985). As these frameworks became more sophisticated and well-defined it became clear that they were restricted variants of FOPC coupled with specialized inference procedures. A useful collection of papers covering much of this work can be found in Brachman and Levesque (1985). Russell and Norvig (1995) describe a modern perspective on these representational efforts.

Linguistic efforts to assign semantic structures to natural language sentences in the generative era began with the work of Katz and Fodor (1963). The limitations of their simple feature-based representations and the natural fit of logic

to many of linguistic problems of the day quickly led to the adoption of a variety of predicate-argument structures as preferred semantic representations (Lakoff, 1972; McCawley, 1968). The subsequent introduction by Montague (1973) of truth-conditional model-theoretic framework into linguistic theory led to a much tighter integration between theories of formal syntax and a wide range of formal semantic frameworks. Good introductions to Montague semantics and its role in linguistic theory can be found in Dowty et al. (1981), Partee (1976).

The representation of events as reified objects is due to Davidson (1967). The approach presented here, which explicitly reifies event participants, is due to Parsons (1990). The use of modal operators and in the representation of knowledge and belief is due to Hintikka (1969). Moore (1977) was the first to make computational use of this approach. Fauconnier (1985) deals with a wide range of issues relating to beliefs and belief spaces from a cognitive science perspective. Most current computational approaches to temporal reasoning are based on Allen's notion of temporal intervals (Allen, 1984). ter Meulen (1995) provides a modern treatment of tense and aspect. Davis (1990) describes the use of FOPC to represent knowledge across a wide range of common sense domains including quantities, space, time, and beliefs.

A recent comprehensive treatment of logic and language can be found in van Benthem and ter Meulen (1997). The classic semantics text is Lyons (1977). McCawley (1993) is an indispensable textbook covering a wide range of topics concerning logic and language. Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1991) also provides broad coverage of semantic issues from a linguistic perspective. Heim and Kratzer (1998) is a more recent text written from the perspective of current generative theory.

EXERCISES

- 17.1** Choose a recipe from your favorite cookbook and try to make explicit all the common-sense knowledge that would be needed to follow it.
- 17.2** Proponents of information retrieval occasionally claim that natural language texts in their raw form are a perfectly suitable source of knowledge for question answering. Sketch an argument against this claim.
- 17.3** Peruse your daily newspaper for three examples of ambiguous sentences. Describe the various sources of the ambiguities.
- 17.4** Consider a domain where the word *coffee* can refer to the following concepts in a knowledge-based: a caffeinated or decaffeinated beverage, ground coffee used

to make either kind of beverage, and the beans themselves. Give arguments as to which of the following uses of coffee are ambiguous and which are vague.

- a. I've had my coffee for today.
- b. Buy some coffee on your way home.
- c. Please grind some more coffee.

17.5 Encode in FOPC as much of the knowledge as you can that you came up with for Exercise 17.1

17.6 The following rule, which we gave as a translation for Example 17.24, is not a reasonable definition of what it means to be a vegetarian restaurant.

$$\forall x \text{VegetarianRestaurant}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Serves}(x, \text{VegetarianFood})$$

Give a FOPC rule that better defines vegetarian restaurants in terms of what they serve.

17.7 Give a FOPC translations for the following sentences:

- a. Vegetarians do not eat meat.
- b. Not all vegetarians eat eggs.

17.8 Give a set of facts and inferences necessary to prove the following assertions:

- a. McDonalds is not a vegetarian restaurant.
- b. Some vegetarians can eat at McDonalds.

Don't just place these facts in your knowledge base. Show that they can be inferred from some more general facts about vegetarians and McDonalds.

17.9 Give FOPC translations for the following sentences that capture the temporal relationships between the events.

- a. When Mary's flight departed, I ate lunch.
- b. When Mary's flight departed, I had eaten lunch.

17.10 Give a reasonable FOPC translation of the following example.

If you're interested in baseball, the Rockies are playing tonight.

17.11 On Page 19 we gave the following FOPC translation for Example 17.21.

$$\text{Have}(\text{Speaker}, \text{FiveDollars}) \wedge \neg \text{Have}(\text{Speaker}, \text{LotOfTime})$$

This literal representation would not be particularly useful to a restaurant-oriented question answering system. Give a deeper FOPC meaning representation for this example that is closer to what it really means.

17.12 On Page 19, we gave the following representation as a translation for the sentence *Ay Caramba is near ICSI*.

$Near(LocationOf(AyCaramba), LocationOf(ICSI))$

In our truth-conditional semantics, this formula is either true or false given the contents of some knowledge-base. Critique this truth-conditional approach with respect to the meaning of words like *near*.

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