



Lecture 9: Buffer Overflows

CS 105


February 19, 2020

From Last time...

- Basic Principle

`T A[L];`

- Array of data type T and length L
- Identifier \mathbf{A} can be used as a pointer to array element 0: Type T^*



- Reference

Reference	Type	Value
<code>val[4]</code>	<code>int</code>	3
<code>val</code>	<code>int *</code>	x
<code>val+1</code>	<code>int *</code>	$x+4$
<code>&val[2]</code>	<code>int *</code>	$x+8$
<code>val[5]</code>	<code>int</code>	??
<code>*(val+1)</code>	<code>int</code>	5
<code>val + i</code>	<code>int *</code>	$x+4i$

Memory Referencing Bug Example

```
void f1() {  
    double a2[2] = {1.0, 2.0};  
    int a1[4] = {1, 2, 3, 4};  
    a1[4] = 1413754136;  
    a1[5] = 1074340347;  
}
```

```
f1:  
    sub    $0x38,%rsp  
    movsd  0x216(%rip),%xmm0  
    movsd  %xmm0,0x20(%rsp)  
    movsd  0x210(%rip),%xmm0  
    movsd  %xmm0,0x28(%rsp)  
    movl   $0x1,0x10(%rsp)  
    movl   $0x2,0x14(%rsp)  
    movl   $0x3,0x18(%rsp)  
    movl   $0x4,0x1c(%rsp)  
    movl   $0x54442d18,0x20(%rsp)  
    movl   $0x400921fb,0x24(%rsp)  
    add    $0x38,%rsp  
    retq
```


Another Memory Bug Example

```
int f2(){
    int a1[4] = {1,2,3,4};
    a1[6] = 47;
}
```

```
f2:
    sub    $0x18,%rsp
    movl   $0x1, (%rsp)
    movl   $0x2, 0x4(%rsp)
    movl   $0x3, 0x8(%rsp)
    movl   $0x4, 0xc(%rsp)
    movl   $0x2f, 0x18(%rsp)
    add    $0x18,%rsp
    retq
```


Review: Stack Frames

- Each function called gets a stack frame
- Passing data:
 - calling procedure P uses registers (and stack) to provide parameters to Q.
 - Q uses register `%rax` for return value
- Passing control:
 - **call <proc>**
 - Pushes return address (current `%rip`) onto stack
 - Sets `%rip` to first instruction of proc
 - **ret**
 - Pops return address from stack and places it in `%rip`
- Local storage:
 - allocate space on the stack by decrementing stack pointer, deallocate by incrementing



String Memory Referencing Bug

- Most common form of memory reference bug
 - Unchecked lengths on string inputs
 - Particularly for bounded character arrays on the stack
 - sometimes referred to as stack smashing



```
/* Echo Line */
void echo()
{
    char buf[4];
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}
```

```
echo:
    subq    $0x18, %rsp
    movq    %rsp, %rdi
    call   gets
    call   puts
    addq    $0x18, %rsp
    ret
```


Exercise

```
int authenticate(char *password) {
    char buf[4];
    gets(buf);
    int correct
        = !strcmp(password, buf);
    return correct;
}

int main(int argc,
         char ** argv) {
    char * pw = "123456";
    printf("Enter your password: ");
    while(!authenticate(pw)) {
        printf("Incorrect. Try again: ");
    }
    printf("You are now logged in\n");
    return 0;
}
```

Buffer Overflow Examples

ARPANET Geographic Map, 31 October 1988




Defense #1: Avoid Overflow Vulnerabilities

```
/* Echo Line */  
void echo()  
{  
    char buf[4]; /* Way too small! */  
    fgets(buf, 4, stdin);  
    puts(buf);  
}
```

- For example, use library routines that limit string lengths
 - `fgets` instead of `gets`
 - `strncpy` instead of `strcpy`
 - Don't use `scanf` with `%s` conversion specification
 - Use `fgets` to read the string
 - Or use `%ns` where `n` is a suitable integer

Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities




Defense #2: Compiler checks

0x7FFFFFFF


- Idea
 - Place special value (“canary”) on stack just beyond buffer
 - Check for corruption before exiting function

- GCC Implementation
 - **-fstack-protector**
 - Now the default (disabled earlier)

0x00000000



Stack Canaries



`authenticate:`

```

pushq   %rbx
subq    $16, %rsp
movq    %rdi, %rbx
movq    %fs:40, %rax
movq    %rax, 8(%rsp)
xorl    %eax, %eax
movq    %rsp, %rdi
call    gets
movq    %rsp, %rsi
movq    %rbx, %rdi
call    strcmp
testl   %eax, %eax
sete    %al
movq    8(%rsp), %rdx
xorq    %fs:40, %rdx
je      .L2
call    __stack_chk_fail
.L2:
movzbl  %al, %eax
addq    $16, %rsp
popq    %rbx
ret

```